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Plainly, the external powers of the United States are to be exer-
cised without regard to state laws or policies.... [I]n respect of
our foreign relations generally, state lines disappear. As to such
purposes the state of New York does not exist.... State Consti-
tutions, state laws, and state policies are irrelevant to the inquiry
and decision. It is inconceivable that any of them can be inter-
posed as an obstacle to the effective operation of a federal con-
stitutional power.'
Introduction
State and local governments have no constitutional power to reg-
ulate foreign affairs. It is not merely that such power is specifically
denied to them by the Constitution;2 they would be impotent even
without such proscriptions. Power over foreign affairs is a concomi-
tant of national sovereignty,3 a feature never possessed by the individ-
ual states. Accordingly, federalism, and all of its attendant
implications for reserved powers in the states,4 is simply an inapposite
construct when it comes to the external affairs of the nation.' "Power
1. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937) (citation omitted).
2. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 ("No state shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or
confederation; grant letters of marque and reprisal . . . "); cl. 3 ("No state shall, without the
consent of Congress, lay any duty of tonnage, keep troops, or ships of war in time of peace,
enter into any agreement or compact with another state, or with a foreign power, or engage
in war, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay.").
3. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936). This
power does not "depend upon affirmative grants of the Constitution." Id "The powers to
declare and wage war, to conclude peace, to make treaties, to maintain diplomatic relations
with other sovereignties, if they had never been mentioned in the Constitution, would have
vested in the federal government as necessary concomitants of nationality." Id. In short,
the Constitution is not the sole source of authority "in matters requiring national action,
[for such powers] must belong to and somewhere reside in every civilized government."
Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
4. See U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or
to the people.").
5. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1940) ("Our system of government is
such that the interest of the cities, counties and states, no less than the interest of the
people of the whole nation, imperatively requires that federal power in the field affecting
STATE IMMIGRATION AND FEDERAL SUPREMACY
over external affairs is not shared by the States; it is vested in the
national government exclusively."16
Despite this long-standing and consistent understanding, states
and their political subdivisions often act in ways that implicate the
nation's foreign relations. Much of this has been benign, such as sis-
ter-city arrangements,7 initiatives in trade and trans-border coopera-
tion,8 and precatory policy statements.9 But, states have also
endeavored to engage directly in foreign relations, such as through
extradition agreements,' ° foreign trade restrictions," setting military
policy,' 2 and by encouraging defection from communist countries.' 3
foreign relations be left entirely free from local interference."); Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp., 299 U.S. at 316 ("That [the doctrine of enumerated powers] applies only to powers
which the states had is self-evident. And since the states severally never possessed interna-
tional powers, such powers could not have been carved from the mass of state powers but
obviously were transmitted to the United States from some other source."). See also Louis
HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONsTITUTON 5 (1972) [hereinafter FOREIGN AF-
FAIRs] ("Federalism... rarely raises its head in foreign relations since for these purposes
the United States is virtually a unitary state.").
6. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942).
7. See Richard B. Bilder, The Role of States and Cities in Foreign Relations, 83 AM. J.
INT'L L. 821, 822 (1989) [hereinafter Foreign Relations] ("Over 830 cities and other munici-
pal governments have established official 'sister city' relationships with over 1270 cities and
communities in 90 other countries.").
8. Id. ("Over 40 states have established trade or investment offices in foreign
countries.").
9. See, e.g. AFL-CIO v. Eu, 686 P.2d 609,626 (Cal. 1984) (discussing California Prop-
osition 12 (1982) which endorsed a bilateral freeze on the construction of nuclear weapons
and required the governor to transmit that endorsement to the President and other federal
officials); Farley v. Healey, 431 P.2d 650 (Cal. 1967) (San Francisco city initiative declaring
city policy favoring an immediate cease fire in Vietnam and withdrawal of American
troops from that country). These initiatives are often "nothing more than a non-binding
expression of public opinion," without the force of law. See Nebraska ex rel Brant v.
Beermann, 350 N.W.2d 18, 22-23 (Neb. 1984).
10. See Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540 (1840).
11. See generally Howard N. Fenton, The Fallacy of Federalism in Foreign Affairs: State
and Local Foreign Policy Trade Restrictions, 13 J. INT. L. Bus. 563 (1993); Eduardo E.
Neret, Marcio W. Valladares, The Florida International Affairs Act: A Model for State Ac-
tivism in Foreign Affairs, 1 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 197 (1992) [hereinafter State
Activism].
12. See, eg., Perpich v. United States Dep't of Defense, 880 F.2d 11 (8th Cir. 1989);
afj'd, 496 U.S. 334 (1990) (invalidating effort by governor to prevent state national guard
troops from participating in military exercises in Central America); Dukakis v. United
States Dep't of Defense, 859 F.2d 1066 (1st Cir. 1988) (same); Fossella v. Dinkins, 110
A.D.2d 227 (N.Y. 1985) (invalidating ballot initiative prohibiting the sale or use of munici-
pal property for "the development of any military facility, any component of which is
designed to carry or store nuclear weapons"), affd on other grounds, 488 N.E.2d 117 (N.Y.
1985); Arthur D. Little, Inc. v. Comm'r of Health & Hosp. of Cambridge, 481 N.E.2d 441
(Mass. 1985) (upholding municipal ban on production of chemical warfare). See generally
Stephanie A. Levin, Grassroots Voices: Local Action and National Military Policy, 40
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"Municipal foreign policy" is so much a part of the landscape, there is
even a magazine by that name.' 4
One recurring manifestation of state involvement in foreign af-
fairs is the regulation of aliens and immigration. Outsiders by defini-
tion, aliens are often viewed as threatening a state's cultural and
political identity, undermining its communitarian values, and taxing its
public resources. In times of social and economic stress, aliens be-
come prime targets of reaction. This is a persistent phenomenon
which has once again emerged prominent on the national scene.' 5
Historically, some state immigration laws have been fairly explicit,
such as alien registration requirements, 16 and exclusion of aliens from
entry. 7 Others have been less direct, but no less forceful, as where
civil disabilities are imposed on aliens regarding employment,' 8 suc-
cession, 19 education,20 and state benefits.2 '
Some early cases suggested that states could regulate immigra-
tion, at least that of "undesirable" aliens.' The Supreme Court's first
approach to the issue was to treat immigration as a species of com-
merce.23 Thus, developing doctrines on the relative powers of state
BuFF. L. Rnv. 321 (1992); Michael H. Shuman, Dateline Main Street: Local Foreign Poli-
cies, 65 FOREIGN POLICY 154, 157 (Winter 1986-87).
13. See Florida Territorial Waters Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 370.21(9) (1963), discussed
in John N. Moore, Federalism and Foreign Relations, 1965 DuKE L.J. 248,311-17 [hereinaf-
ter Federalism and Foreign Relations].
14. The quarterly Bulletin of Municipal Foreign Policy was published until 1991 by the
Center for Innovative Diplomacy. See 5 BULL. MUN. FOREIGN POL'Y, No. 2 (Spring 1991).
15. For an early history of state immigration laws, see chapter on "State Immigration
Legislation" in Volume 39, 1911 REPORT OF THE DILLINGHAM COMMISSION, S. Doc. No.
758, 61st Cong., 3d Sess. 9 (1911) [hereinafter DILLINGHAM REPORT].
16. See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
17. See, e.g., Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1875). See generally GERALD
NEUMAN, THE LOST CENTURY OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAW (1776-1875) 1833 (1993)
[hereinafter LOST CENTURY]. Antebellum state laws prohibiting the entry of slaves and
free blacks, although "immigration laws" in every sense, will not be discussed here because
of their unique character and detachment from foreign affairs. For a thorough analysis of
such laws, see id. at 1865-80.
18. See, eg., In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973) (Connecticut's exclusion of resident
aliens from law practice was unconstitutional); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973)
(alien exclusion from civil service positions was unconstitutional).
19. See, e.g., Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968); Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503
(1947).
20. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (excluding undocumented immigrant
children from public schools); Tayyari v. New Mexico State Univ., 495 F. Supp. 1365
(D.N.M., 1980) (excluding Iranian students from state university).
21. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (states could not deny welfare
benefits to aliens). For further discussion of this line of cases, see infra Section V.
22. See infra note 113.
23. See infra note 207.
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and federal governments were applied to both commerce in goods and
commerce in people.24 The most profound example of this was the
states' unabridgable constitutional power to regulate the importation
of slaves until 1808.?
However, by 1875, the Supreme Court came to see immigration
control as an implicit federal power, inextricably related to the power
over foreign affairs.26 Since then, the Court has developed two doctri-
nal approaches to state power over immigration and aliens: equal pro-
tection and preemption. State laws that discriminate against aliens are
nominally subject to strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection
Clause.17 The theory here is that aliens bear at least some of the indi-
cia of a suspect class, including a history of discrimination and political
powerlessness. 28 However, two important exceptions have emerged
where the Court relaxes its equal protection scrutiny. The first is
24. People were treated as commerce in Supreme Court decisions as late as Edwards
v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941). See infra note 207 and accompanying text.
25. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1 ("The migration or importation of such persons as
any of the states now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the
Congress prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a tax or duty may be
imposed on such importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each person."); Art. V ("no
amendment which may be made prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight
shall in any manner affect the first and fourth clauses in the ninth section of the first Arti-
cle"). See also Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 625 (1842) (states had power to
"arrest and restrain runaway slaves, and remove them from their borders, and otherwise to
secure themselves against their depredations and evil example.").
26. See Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280 (1875); Henderson v. Mayor of New
York, 92 U.S. 259 (1875). This is also the modern view. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342
U.S. 580, 588-89 (1952) ("any policy toward aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven with
contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of foreign relations, the war power, and
the maintenance of a republican form of government"); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52,
62 (1941) (federal power in the general field of foreign affairs, including power over immi-
gration, naturalization, and deportation, is supreme). This doctrinal development occurred
at about the same time as Congress took an active interest in regulating immigration. Fed-
eral immigration laws briefly appeared early in our history (Naturalization Act of 1798, ch.
54, 1 Stat. 566, repealed by Act of Apr. 14, 1802, ch. 28, § 5, 2 Stat. 153, 155), but the first
permanent law was passed in 1875. See Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 141, § 5, 18 Stat. 477, 477
(excluding immigrant felons).
27. See infra note 73.
28. "[C]lassifications based on alienage, like those based on nationality or race, are
inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny. Aliens as a class are a prime ex-
ample of a 'discrete and insular' minority for whom such heightened judicial solicitude is
appropriate." Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. at 372 (quoting United States v. Carolene
Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938)). See generally Note, Developments in the Law:
Immigration Policy and the Rights of Aliens, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1286, 1408 (1983) [hereinaf-
ter Immigration Policy]. But see Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 657 (1973) (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting) (There "is a marked difference between a status or condition such as
illegitimacy, national origin, or race, which cannot be altered by an individual and the
'status' of [alienage].").
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where the state discriminates with respect to state employment in pol-
icy-making or policy-implementing positions-so called "political
function" jobs.2 9 The other is where the discrimination is against
aliens present in the state in violation of federal law-so called "ille-
gal" or "undocumented" aliens.3 °
The Court's equal protection approach to alienage discrimination
is problematic. Aliens are no less a "suspect class," in terms of the
classical indicia, when the disadvantage relates to government jobs or
where they lack immigration papers.31 The state may have a greater
interest in these contexts, or there may be lesser conflict with federal
policies. However, contorting equal protection doctrine to permit
greater state authority in these instances seems an unsatisfactory way
to recognize that the respective state and federal interests are now
different.32
The second principal doctrine for analyzing state immigration
laws is preemption. Under the Supremacy Clause,33 state laws that
conffict with federal law, or obstruct federal policy, are preempted. 34
The usual tests for express and implied preemption are implicated
whenever Congress, the President, or a federal agency act in the area
of immigration.35 Treaties are also the "supreme law of the land,"36
29. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973).
30. Another exception to strict equal protection scrutiny is where Congress, rather
than the states, is discriminating. See infra note 501 and accompanying text.
31. Indeed, one could argue that undocumented aliens have a greater history of dis-
crimination and less political power than resident aliens. Their status is also more immuta-
ble than lawfully present aliens who, some day, may qualify for citizenship. On these
grounds, they would have a stronger claim to "suspect class" status, not a weaker one. See
In re Alien Children Educ. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 544, 559 (S.D. Tex. 1980), aff'd sub nom.
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,209-10 (1982), ("The rights of man are not a function of immi-
gration status"). But see idt at 565 nA0 ("undocumented status is not a characteristic which
an individual cannot control.., undocumented adults have control and individual respon-
sibility for their present status.").
32. These problems are more fully explored in Section V, infra.
33. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution of Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.").
34. It has long been the rule that state interference with federal policies and agencies
"is absolutely void, wherever such attempted exercise of authority expressly conflicts with
the laws of the United States, and either frustrates the purpose of the national legislation
or impairs the efficiency of these agencies of the Federal government to discharge the
duties, for the performance of which they were created." Davis v. Elmira Savings Bank,
161 U.S. 275, 283 (1896).
35. Federal law may preempt state or local law in different ways. Congress may pre-
empt state law by expressly stating its intention to do so. California v. ARC America
Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 101 (1989). Absent express preemption, a court may infer a congres-
and may protect foreign nationals in the United States from state ac-
tion.3 7 But federal dominance and exclusivity do not require the exist-
ence of positive law in order to find that states are ousted from
regulation. Even in the absence of specific federal enactments, states
may not usurp Congress' latent-but plenary-power over
immigration.38
This theory of supremacy lies somewhere between standard pre-
emption doctrine and explicit constitutional restraint. If Congress af-
firmatively legislates, or if the Constitution prohibits, 39 then state laws
may not contravene. But, even where Congress and the Constitution
are both silent, states may still be forbidden to act. This results from a
sional intent to preempt from a scheme of federal regulation sufficiently comprehensive to
occupy a given field or to make clear that Congress left no room for supplementary state
legislation. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n., 461 U.S. 190, 204 (1983); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230
(1947). Moreover, even if Congress has not completely preempted state regulation in a
particular area, state law is preempted to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal
law. "Such a conflict arises when 'compliance with both federal and state regulations is a
physical impossibility' ... or when state law 'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."' Hillsborough County,
Fla. v. Auto. Med. Labs. Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985) (citations omitted). For a general
review of preemption doctrine, see California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S.
272, 280-81 (1987).
36. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1.
37. Rights of foreign nationals are the frequent subject of treaties. See, e.g., Treaty
with Japan of Feb. 21, 1911, 37 Stat. 1504 (securing to the citizens of Japan the right to
"enter, travel and reside" in the United States and "to carry on trade, wholesale and retail
... and generally to do anything incident to or necessary for trade"); Treaty between the
United States and Italy of 1871, 17 Stat. 845-46 ("The citizens of each of the high con-
tracting parties shall receive, in the states and territories of the other, the most constant
protection and security for their persons and property, and shall enjoy in this respect the
same rights and privileges as are, or shall be, granted to the natives, on their submitting
themselves to the conditions imposed upon the natives"). Many treaties contain a similar
"most favored nation clause." "providing that the citizens of such countries shall enjoy all
the privileges, rights and immunities which the citizens of countries most favored in any
existing treaty with the United States enjoy." Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175, 180-81 (1915).
See also Ohio v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392 (1927).
38. In De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976), the Supreme Court considered whether a
state law prohibiting the employment of undocumented alien workers violated the
Supremacy Clause. The Court divided the inquiry into three components. The first was
whether the state law intruded into an area of exclusive federal concern, i.e., immigration
control. Id. at 355. The second inquiry was whether states were ousted from regulation by
federal occupation of the field. Id. at 357. The third was whether the state law under
challenge conflicted with federal law or burdened federal policy objectives. Id. at 358.
This article principally concerns the first of these supremacy doctrines, what is referred to
here as "constitutional preclusion." The remaining preemption doctrines require ad hoc
examination of particular state laws in light of specific federal law and policy.
39. The Constitution does prohibit state action in the realm of foreign affairs (see
supra note 2), but is not explicit regarding state power over immigration.
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lack of state power over immigration in the first place, and a restric-
tion on any power they may possess if its exercise intrudes on a fed-
eral domain. This is one of the "great silences of the Constitution":40
states may not usurp or obstruct federal power, even when that power
remains unexercised.
The notion that a state cannot regulate foreign affairs resembles
the "dormant Commerce Clause," where state laws which directly reg-
ulate or burden interstate commerce are invalid under a theory of
"negative preemption. '41 Since exclusive and plenary power is re-
posed in Congress, states are ousted from the field.42 State entry into
an exclusively federal domain usurps congressional authority and un-
dermines our federalistic scheme.43 This is even truer in the area of
foreign affairs and immigration than it is with interstate commerce,
both as a matter of constitutional theory,44 and as a matter of prece-
dent.4 5 For instance, actions by a single state, offensive to a foreign
power, could require resolution or redress by the entire nation.4 6 Pre-
clusion of state laws touching foreign affairs avoids this potential for
conflict. Thus, even when Congress' power to regulate foreign affairs
lies "dormant" (i.e., unused), the states may be judicially precluded
40. H.P. Hood and Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 535 (1949).
41. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 210 (1824) (describing the "negative
implications" of the Commerce Clause).
42. For an application of this doctrine to both commerce and foreign affairs, see
Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 574 (1840) ("[W]here an authority is granted to
the Union, to which a similar authority in the states would be absolutely and totally contra-
dictory and repugnant, there the authority to the federal government is necessarily exclu-
sive; and the same power cannot be constitutionally exercised by the states.").
43. See Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
44. It may be said, with respect to power over commerce, that the states possessed
such power prior to the Constitution. Therefore, any relinquishment to Congress (per the
Commerce Clause) must be read in light of the Tenth Amendment and retained state pow-
ers. The same is not true, however, with respect to foreign affairs, since federal power in
this area is not dependent upon any grant from the states, nor limited by any reservation of
power. Cf Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283,420 (1849) (separate opinion by Wayne,
J.)
45. See Japan Line Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 446 (1979) (state
actions affecting foreign commerce would be given closer scrutiny than those affecting in-
terstate commerce).
46. Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275,280 (1875) ("If [our] government has forbidden
the States to hold negotiations with any foreign nations, or to declare war, and has taken
the' whole subject of these relations upon herself, has the Constitution, which provides for
this, done so foolish a thing as to leave it in the power of the States to pass laws whose
enforcement renders the general government liable to just reclamations which it must an-
swer, while it does not prohibit to the States the acts for which it is held responsible?").
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from entering the area. "If it be otherwise, a single State can, at her
pleasure, embroil us in disastrous quarrels with other nations."'47
This rule too can be overstated. There indeed may be an "inher-
ent danger of state action [in] all matters relating to foreign affairs, '4 8
yet state action that "merely has foreign resonances, but does not im-
plicate foreign affairs,"4 9 is not per se invalid. Legitimate matters of
local concern are often caught up with international issues. This is
readily apparent in such areas as health and safety regulation and
state taxation which, while locally directed, can and do have some im-
pact on foreign affairs. For instance, a municipal noise ordinance
might result in a ban on ffights of the British-French Concorde.50
State efforts to tax the local business of international entities may af-
fect their international structure and bookkeeping.5' Without in-
tending to disturb international relations, local police power
enactments can still do just that. Furthermore, state and local enact-
ments often conffict with principles of civil and political rights embod-
ied in international agreements.5a Thus, expansive application of a
preclusion doctrine could negate much of the states' police powers.
Accordingly, some accommodation is needed in these cases.
Nominally, the key question is whether the state is deemed to be
regulating foreign affairs, which it cannot do, or regulating local af-
fairs, such as health and welfare, which it can do pursuant to its police
powers.53 As Justice Field described it in the Chinese Exclusion
Case:54
The control of local matters being left to local authorities, and
national matters being entrusted to the government of the
Union, the problem of free institutions existing over a widely
extended country, having different climates and varied interests,
has been happily solved. For local interests the several States of
the Union exist, but for national purposes, embracing our rela-
47. Id.
48. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62 n.9 (1940).
49. Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 194 (1983).
50. See British Airways Bd. v. Port Auth. of New York, 558 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1977);
"[F]or purposes of the Supremacy Clause, the constitutionality of local ordinances is ana-
lyzed in the same way as that of statewide laws." Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Auto. Med.
Labs., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985).
51. See Barclays Bank v. Franchise Tax Rd. of California, 114 S.Ct. 2268 (1994). See
also Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Florida Dep't. of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1 (1986).
52. See Sei Fujii v. State, 217 P.2d 481 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950), affd on other grounds, 242
P.2d 617 (Cal. 1952), (Alien Land Law restricting ownership of land by aliens ineligible for
citizenship was preempted by the United Nations Charter).
53. This difference between regulation of foreign and domestic matters is not always
obvious, but it is often determinative. See infra Section II D.
54. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
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tions with foreign nations, we are but one people, one nation,
one power.55
The trouble with this distinction lies in its application; there is
often no bright line of demarcation between "local" and "national"
matters, or between domestic and foreign regulation.5 6  Instead,
courts have endeavored to distinguish between state laws with an "in-
cidental" effect on foreign affairs and those that "directly" affect the
external relations of the United States.57 Laws of the former type are
valid so long as the effect on national interests is not too great relative
to the local interests served. Laws in the latter category are virtually
per se invalid.
The same distinction applies to state laws affecting immigration.
States have a valid interest in regulating persons within their borders,
including aliens. However, they are often insensitive to the delicate
international and immigration policy issues at stake in alien regula-
tion.58 As a result, they may overreact to social problems perceived
caused by the presence of aliens, often with repercussions on national
interests. Federal supremacy is protected both by normal preemption
doctrines and by constitutional preclusion. Under the latter, state
laws with only an incidental effect on immigration policy will stand
unless they impose a substantial burden on foreign policy or federal
interests. However, state laws enacted for the purpose of regulating
aliens or controlling immigration are invalid since neither is a proper
concern of state or local legislatures.59
This Article explores these themes and endeavors to create a rule
for evaluating state immigration laws and their compatibility with the
Supremacy Clause. It concludes that states seldom have a legitimate
55. Id. at 605-06.
56. See Federalism and Foreign Relations, supra note 13, at 297 ("In theory, [the] dis-
tinction between foreign and domestic affairs is plain, but in practice the distinction is often
extremely subtle and elusive.").
57. See, e.g., Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 194
(1983) ("if a state tax merely has foreign resonances, but does not implicate foreign affairs,
we cannot infer [invalidity], [a]bsent some explicit directive from Congress . .
58. See generally Immigration Policy, supra note 28, at 1447-48.
59. In Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), Chief Justice Marshall ex-
plained the difference between regulation of an object and regulations affecting that object.
States may have no power to regulate a particular object (in Gibbons, interstate com-
merce) because its governance is entrusted to Congress. However, states do have power to
regulate other objects (e.g., health and safety) and may employ means which operate on
objects of federal control, yet without objection. "If a state, in passing laws on subjects
acknowledged to be within its control, and with a view to those subjects, shall adopt a
measure of the same character with one which Congress may adopt, it does not derive its
authority from the particular power which has been granted [to Congress], but from some
other, which remains with the state, and may be executed by the same means." Id at 204.
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interest in regulating immigration. Laws penalizing aliens, including
undocumented ones, can stand only where there is some affirmative
congressional acceptance of state involvement. Where Congress is si-
lent and, of course, where it speaks to the contrary, state laws having
substantial effect on immigration or aliens are likely unconstitutional.
On the other hand, state laws aimed at local concerns are not invalid
simply because aliens "feel the pinch."'60 Here the question is one of
degree: whether the local benefits justify the incidental effect on na-
tional immigration and foreign policies.
Some cases and commentators have drawn a sharp distinction be-
tween "legal" immigrants, i.e., those lawfully admitted by Congress
for temporary or permanent residence, and so-called "illegal" aliens-
those who entered the country unlawfully or who have overstayed a
lawful entry.61 This distinction can be found in both equal protection
and preemption cases, but it is more apparent than real. The state has
no greater power or interest, under either doctrine, in regulating the
admission of illegal entrants than legal ones. 62 Therefore, direct regu-
lation of "illegal," as well as "legal," aliens is prohibited. But, a differ-
ent result may be obtained where the local law is aimed at legitimate
state concerns and its regulatory impact on immigration is only inci-
dental.63 Laws having an indirect impact on undocumented aliens,
even when that impact is substantial, may be less in conflict with fed-
60. Cf. United States v. Women's Sportswear Mfrs. Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460, 464 (1949)
(describing judicial invalidation under the dormant Commerce Clause of state laws affect-
ing commerce).
61. The term "illegal alien" is both unknown to federal immigration law and a misno-
mer. Mere presence in the United States without permission is not a crime, although it
may subject the individual to a civil proceeding-deportation. See infra note 324. How-
ever, the term is typically used in the vernacular to include all persons lacking official
immigration papers, most of whom have committed only civil offenses. The categories
mentioned in the text are not exhaustive since the complexities of immigration law do not
admit simple definitions. At the very least, one would want to distinguish between aliens
who entered or remain without proper documentation, who nonetheless have a claim to
stay in the country (e.g., pending application for asylum or adjustment of status), and those
who entered illegally. See 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (1952); Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468,
474-76 (9th Cir. 1983); In re Alien Children Educ. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 544, 583 nn.103-04
(S.D. Tex. 1980).
62. See United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 915 (1975) (White, J., concurring) ("This
problem [illegal immigration] essentially poses questions of national policy and is chiefly
the business of Congress and the Executive Branch.").
63. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,225 (1982) ("States do have some authority to act
with respect to illegal aliens, at least where such action mirrors federal objectives and fur-
thers a legitimate state goal.").
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eral policy, and on that basis may survive scrutiny.64 Still, the consti-
tutional doctrine itself does not distinguish between the two classes of
aliens.
This Article briefly traces the development of immigration regu-
lation in the United States. It then describes the nature of federal
supremacy in immigration matters. Next, it explores a variety of state
immigration laws, both those which may be considered "direct" regu-
lation and those which are "incidental," and the interests they pur-
portedly advance. Lastly, the Article examines the present equal
protection model for handling alien discrimination laws, and whether
preemption is a superior analytical tool for such cases.
I. The Development of Alien and Immigration Laws in the
United States
A. Give Me Your Tired and Poor, Your Huddled Masses Yearning to
Breathe Free
The Constitution draws few distinctions between citizens and
non-citizens. 65 Except for the qualifications for high political office,
"in looking at the text, one is struck initially by the lack of importance
of citizenship. 66 This seems to reflect early acceptance of aliens
amongst us67 (with the exception perhaps of the British during the
revolutionary period68 and poor aliens at any time69) and hostility to
64. See id. at 219 n.19 ("[Ilf the Federal Government has by uniform rule prescribed
what it believes to be appropriate standards for the treatment of an alien subclass, the
States may, of course, follow the federal direction.").
65. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 739 (1893) (Brewer, J., dissent-
ing) ("It is worthy of notice that in [the first 10 amendments] the word 'citizen' is not
found."). Of course the original text draws distinctions in three places between citizens and
African slaves.
66. R. Frederick Schauer, Community, Citizenship, and the Search for National Iden-
tity, 84 MICH. L. REv. 1504, 1508 (1986) [hereinafter Search for National Identity].
67. See William B. Wong, Comment, Iron Curtain Statutes, Communist China, and the
Right to Devise, 32 UCLA L. REV. 643, 645 (1985) [hereinafter Iron Curtain Statutes]; The
Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 401 (1849) ("To encourage foreign emigration was
a cherished policy of this country at the time the Constitution was adopted."). Indeed, the
country had mostly open borders, both literally and figuratively, for much of our first cen-
tury. See generally LOST CENTURY, supra note 17; 1 CHARLES GORDON & STANLEY MAIL-
MAN, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE 2-5 (rev. ed. 1993); PETER H. ScHucK &
ROGERS M. SMrrH, CITIZENSHIP WIT1OUT CONSENT: ILLEGAL ALIENS IN THE AMERICAN
POLITY, 116-40 (Yale, 1985) [hereinafter CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT CONSENT].
68. See Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603, 619, 622 (1813)
(confiscation of land devised to British heirs); Cooper v. Telfair, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 14, 19
(1800) (banishment of British loyalists). Laws regulating the slave trade might also be
considered restrictions on immigration, although of a wholly different kind. See generally
LOST CENTURY, supra note 17, at 1836 n.18.
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laws imposing unique burdens on them.71 The question of immigra-
tion was frequently discussed at the Constitutional Convention; yet,
little restriction was imposed. Madison explained why: "He wished to
invite foreigners of merit and republican principles among us.
America was indebted to emigration for her settlement and prosper-
ity."' 71 Aliens had similar recognition and rights in colonial state
charters. 72
Eventually, rights embodied in the Bill of Rights and the Civil
War Amendments were extended to all "persons," citizen and non-
citizen alike,73 including persons in the country without official per-
mission.74 National symbols, such as the Declaration of Indepen-
69. See generally LOST CENTURY, supra note 17, at 1846-59.
70. The Alien Acts of 1798 (Act of June 18, 1798, ch. 54, 1 Stat. 566 (Naturalization
Act); Act of June 25, 1798, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570 (Alien Friends Act); Act of July 6, 1798, ch.
66, 1 Stat. 577 (Alien Enemies Act)) were then, and still are, in high disrepute. See ELKINS
& McKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 591-92 (Oxford 1993) [hereinafter AGE OF FED-
ERALISM] (the Alien Act "was a dead letter from the first. [President] Adams, determined
upon the strictest interpretations, never invoked it, and the Alien Act expired in June 1800
without a single alien having been deported under its provisions"). See also Hines v. Da-
vidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 70-71 (1941) ("So violent was the reaction to the 1798 laws that
almost a century elapsed before a second registration act was passed"); Fong Yue Ting v.
United States, 149 U.S. 698, 747 (1893) (Field, J., dissenting) ("The passage of this act
produced great excitement throughout the country, and was severely denounced by many
of its ablest statesmen and jurists as unconstitutional and barbarous, and among them may
be mentioned the great names of Jefferson and Madison.").
71. 5 ELLIOT'S DEBATES OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 411 (Aug. 1787) (2d ed.
1896).
72. As early as 1641, the Massachusetts "Body of Liberties" stated that "Every person
within this Jurisdiction, whether Inhabitant or forreiner, shall enjoy the same justice and
law that is generall for the plantation... " (cited in Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 70
n.27 (1941)). See also Connecticut Justice Act of 1672, CONN. GEN. STAT. tit. 1, § 3 (rev.
1808) (guaranteeing equal justice to all free persons, whether or not residents of Connecti-
cut, and to foreigners while in the colony).
73. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). See also Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522,
530 (1954) ("since he is a 'person,' an alien has the same protection for his life, liberty and
property under the Due Process Clause as is afforded to a citizen"); Kaoru Yamataya v.
Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1903) (The Japanese Immigrant Case) (Fifth Amendment due
process); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953) (same); Wong Wing v. United
States, 163 U.S. 228,238 (1896) (Equal Protection Clause applies "to all persons within the
territorial jurisdiction" of the United States); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S.
651, 660 (1892) (habeas corpus); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975)
(search and seizure). One notable exception is the Citizenship Clause in the Fourteenth
Amendment, meant to overrule Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
Another exception is the right of franchise in the Fifteenth, Nineteenth, and Twenty-sixth
Amendments. See generally Search for National Identity, supra note 66, at 1508-09.
74. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976) ("There are literally millions of aliens
within the jurisdiction of the United States. The Fifth Amendment, as well as the Four-
teenth Amendment, protects every one of these persons from deprivation of life, liberty, or
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dence,7 the Statue of Liberty,76 and Ellis Island.7 embody and
memorialize these attitudes. President Bush summarized this history
of American hospitality toward immigrants in honoring its "Golden
Door."
[W]hatever their place of origin or point of entry, each genera-
tion of immigrants has bettered America ... immigration has
been one of the largest single factors in our Nation's social, cul-
tural, and economic development ... the other continents arrive
as contributions ... for immigrants have enriched the United
States beyond measure, bringing many contributions to our soci-
ety along with the unique customs and traditions of their ances-
tral homeland. Most important, they have shared eagerly in the
hard work of freedom, helping to defend the ideals of liberty
and self-government and helping to build our churches, schools,
factories, farms, and railroads .... America's history has long
been a story of immigrants. 78
B. Closing the Golden Door
The United States did not restrict immigration for most of its first
century. Congress stated at one point that immigration was "a natu-
ral and inherent right of all people. '79 What little control existed was
property without due process of law.... Even one whose presence in this country is unlaw-
ful, involuntary, or transitory is entitled to that constitutional protection.").
75. The Declaration of Independence 9 (U.S. 1776) (condemning King George: "He
has endeavored to prevent the population of these States; for that purpose obstructing the
laws of naturalization of the foreigners, refusing to pass others to encourage their migra-
tion hither, raising the conditions of new appropriations of land.").
76. See Emma Lazarus, "The New Colossus" (1883) ("Give me your tired and poor,
your huddled masses yearning to breathe free, your wretched refuse of teeming shores,
Send these, the homeless, tempest-tossed to me: I lift my lamp beside the golden door.").
The poem appears on a tablet placed on the Statue's pedestal in 1903. See LoST CENTURY,
supra note 17, at 1834.
77. Ellis Island in New York harbor was the immigration inspection station for 17
million immigrants arriving from Eastern and Southern Europe in the late-19th and early-
20th centuries. It is now part of the Statue of Liberty National Monument. Congress de-
clared January 1, 1992, the station's 100th anniversary, National Ellis Island Day. Pub. L.
No. 102-177. Commemorating that occasion, President George Bush proclaimed the mon-
ument to be "[o]ne of the greatest symbols of American hospitality ... [an] evocative
symbol of so much of our Nation's heritage." Proclamation No. 6398, 56 Fed. Reg. 66,951
(1991). "100 million Americans, some 40 percent of our population, can trace their ances-
try through Ellis Island." Id.
78. Proclamation No. 6398, 56 Fed. Reg. 66,951 (Dec. 23, 1991) (commemorating
100th anniversary of Ellis Island).
79. See An Act concerning the Rights of American Citizens in foreign States, ch. 249,
15 Stat. 223 (1868), discussed in Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sover-
eignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 855 (1987)
[hereinafter United States Sovereignty]. See also Exodus 12:49 ("There shall be but one law
for the native and for the stranger who sojourns among you.").
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pursuant to state law. With some notable exceptions, 0 states initially
shared the welcoming attitude toward aliens. Some state anti-immi-
grant laws and political movements emerged in the 1830's, but thege
were often bound up with religious hostilities directed at Irish
Catholics."' The "Nativist," "Native American," and "Know Noth-
ing" parties were in the vanguard of these movements and were gain-
ing strength until the Civil War diverted the nation's attention.
Although Congress was lobbied for restrictive legislation, it thought
itself powerless in the matter and referred the issue to state
legislatures.'
The high casualty rate during the Civil War created an extraordi-
nary demand for new labor.83 Congress passed laws encouraging im-
migration, which succeeded not only in their goal, but in rekindling
the xenophobia of the pre-war era. Within a few years, economic de-
pression hit the nation, which exacerbated animosity toward immi-
grants. Faced with an uncooperative Congress, nativists turned to
their state legislatures for remedial legislation. A major test of state
power reached the Supreme Court in 1875, which held that states
could not regulate immigration. 84
Congress responded to the Court's denial of state authority by
passing its first restrictive immigration law.85 The law, however, was
limited in scope and immigration continued unabated, particularly
during the rapid industrialization of the late nineteenth century. Un-
deterred by the Supreme Court, and responding to increasing nativ-
ism, state legislatures persisted in their efforts to regulate immigration
and aliens.8 6 Some states passed overt exclusion and deportation
laws.8 7 Others denied land rights to aliens. 8  Many of these state
80. The most obvious were attempts by some states to prevent entry of slaves and free
blacks. See generally LosT CENTURY, supra note 17, at 1865-80. Another exception was
the effort to prevent banishment to America as punishment for crime. See id. at 1841-45.
81. See DILLINGHAM REPORT, supra note 15. "Wild Irish" were also the target of the
Alien Act of 1798, although the Act was never invoked. See AGE OF FEDERALISM, supra
note 70, at 591, 694.
82. DILLINGHAM REPORT, supra note 15, at 16.
83. During the war, President Lincoln at first tried to coordinate immigration policy
with the settlement of emancipated slaves. Id. at 19-20.
84. Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1875); Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92
U.S. 259 (1875).
85. See An Act Supplementary to the Acts in Relation to Immigration, ch. 141, 18
Stat. 477 (1875).
86. Iron Curtain Statutes, supra note 67, at 645.
87. See, e.g., Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1876) (California alien exclusion law).
Gerald Neuman describes five categories of early state exclusion laws: "regulation of the
movement of criminals; public health regulation; regulation of the movement of the poor;
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laws, particularly on the West Coast, were aimed at excluding Chinese
workers, partly to protect "free white labor" from competition and
partly to promote white racial identity.8 9 Congress followed suit with
the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882.90
A further "period of extreme nativism... followed the end of the
First World War"'" when another wave of immigrants sought entry.
Strong sentiments, and state reaction, have recurred periodically since
then.92 State laws have excluded aliens from state natural resources,93
public works contracts,94 hunting game,95 certain trades,96 and private
employment. 97 More recent examples of discrimination include denial
of welfare, 98 medical benefits,99 and education, 100 and employment as
regulation of slavery; and other policies of racial subordination." See generally LOST CEN-
TURy, supra note 17, at 1841. Some early state exclusion laws did not distinguish between
aliens and citizens of other states, purporting to deny entry to categories of both. Id. at
1836 (describing a 1901 Missouri statute prohibiting the importation into the state of "af-
flicted, indigent, or vicious children").
88. E.g., Blythe v. Hinckley, 180 U.S. 333 (1901); Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483
(1880). Denial of alien land rights became more common following World War II. See,
e.g., Frick v. Webb, 263 U.S. 326 (1923); Webb v. O'Brien, 263 U.S. 313 (1923); Porterfield
v. Webb, 263 U.S. 225 (1923); Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923).
89. See LosT CENTURY, supra note 17, at 1872.
90. Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126,22 Stat. 58 (1882). The Supreme Court upheld the law
in the Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
91. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 5 (1967).
92. Nativism can take forms other than the regulation of immigrants and aliens dis-
cussed here. For instance, early in this century some states restricted the teaching and use
of foreign languages. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Bartels v. Iowa, 262
U.S. 404 (1923); Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500 (1926); Farrington v. Tokushige,
273 U.S. 284 (1927) (the Supreme Court invalidated the laws on due process grounds). A
modem variant of this Nativist sentiment is continued in laws that proclaim English to be a
state's official language and that official business (including work-place speech) must occur
in English. A recent Arizona law of this sort was held to violate the First Amendment in
Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 42 F.3d 1217 (9th Cir. 1995), reh'g pending, -
F.3d _.
93. Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n., 334 U.S. 410 (1948); Oyama v. California, 332
U.S. 633, 649 (1948); Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138 (1914); McCready v. Virginia,
94 U.S. 391 (1877).
94. Crane v. New York, 239 U.S. 195 (1915); Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175 (1915).
95. Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138 (1914). See also Ohio ex rel Clarke v. Deck-
ebach, 274 U.S. 392 (1927) (prohibiting aliens from maintaining an inherently dangerous
enterprise).
96. Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1924) (invalidating municipal ordinance prohibit-
ing the granting of pawnbrokers' licenses to noncitizens).
97. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
98. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
99. Monmouth Medical Ctr. v. Hau Kwok, 444 A.2d 610 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1982).
100. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982); Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977) (invali-
dating a citizenship requirement for state scholarships).
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lawyers,101 notaries public,102 civil engineers, 10 3 teachers, 0 4 police of-
ficers, 1°5 and civil servants. 06 And, of course, aliens usually cannot
vote'0 7 or hold public office.10 8 Such laws proliferate as the volume of
immigration, both legal and illegal, increases. 0 9
The modem nativistic renewal is perhaps best exemplified by
California's Proposition 187, passed as an initiative statute in Novem-
ber, 1994.110 It sought to deter illegal immigration into the state by a
comprehensive scheme of classification, reporting, document control,
denial of public benefits, and functional deportation."' Other states
have threatened to pass similar measures. Yet, states are not alone in
their renewed desire to curtail both legal and illegal immigration. In-
cluded within the congressional "revolution" of 1994 were proposals
to withdraw public benefits from legal aliens and strengthen efforts to
protect our borders from illegal entries. There have even been calls
for a constitutional amendment to deny citizenship to persons born on
American soil to undocumented parents." 2 Whether these measures
are sound public policy is beyond the scope of this Article. Its sole
purpose is to explore the extent to which such policies can be adopted
101. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
102. Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216 (1984).
103. Examining Bd. of Engrs., Architects & Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572
(1976).
104. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979).
105. Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291
(1978).
106. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973); Nelson v. Miranda, 413 U.S. 902 (1973),
affg without opinion 351 F. Supp. 735 (D.C. Ariz. 1972) (social service worker and
teacher).
107. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67,78 n.12 ("The Constitution protects the . .. right to
vote only of citizens.").
108. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
109. More than 81h million immigrants entered the United States in the 1980s. See
Penny Loeb, Dorian Friedman & Mary C. Lord, To Make a Nation, U.S. NEws & WORLD
REP., Oct. 4, 1993, at 47. See also Steven Holmes, A Surge in Immigration Surprises Ex-
perts and Intensifies a Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1995, at Al (reporting that the number
of foreign born persons in the United States has doubled in the past 15 years, igniting
public debate on immigration issues).
110. Proposition 187 was enacted at the November 8, 1994 general election and codified
in various California Codes. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 113, 114, 834b (Deering Supp.
1995); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 10001.5 (Deering Supp. 1995); CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 130 (Deering Supp. 1995); CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 48215, 66010.8 (Deering
Supp. 1995); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 53069.65 (Deering Supp. 1995). The author of this article
is a pro bono counsel for plaintiffs in Gregorio T. v. Wilson, Case No. 94-7652 MRF (C.D.
Cal. 1994), one of the cases challenging the constitutionality of Proposition 187.
111. See infra Section III B.
112. See generally Note, The Birthright Citizenship Amendment A Threat to Equality,
107 HARV. L. REV. 1026 (1994) [hereinafter Birthright Citizenship].
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or enforced at the local level. As noted, states have regulated aliens
and immigration throughout American history. Yet, in doing so, they
have usurped exclusive federal power.
C. Taking Aim at Federalism
The Supreme Court's early decisions on state power over immi-
gration drew a distinction between laws designed to exclude "paupers,
vagabonds, and fugitives," and those which denied entry to foreigners
in general." 3 The former were specifically excepted under the Arti-
cles of Confederation from the states' obligation to permit "ingress
and regress" for "free inhabitants" of other states." 4 A similar dis-
tinction was found under the constitution on two theories. First, early
cases that restricted state power over immigration did so on the
ground it interfered with Congress' commerce power; yet these cate-
gories of immigrants were not seen as "commerce." 115 Second, such
persons were generally not made "subjects of admission into the
United States" by Congress; hence state regulation did not undermine
federal laws or objectives." 6 But states did not confine their inspec-
tion and entry laws to poor immigrants. They purported to determine
for themselves which aliens were suitable for admission and which
were not, often with inconclusive response from the Court." 7
It took nearly a century for the Supreme Court to appreciate that
immigration and foreign relations were intimately related. Looking
113. See New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837) (upholding state power to deny
entry to "paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives"); Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13
(1853) (state could rightfully prevent the immigration of persons "unacceptable" to it).
Indeed, under the Articles of Confederation, Congress requested that states do so. See 13
J. of Cong. 105-06 (Sept. 16,1788) ("Resolved, That it be, and it is hereby recommended to
the several states to pass proper laws for preventing the transportation of convicted male-
factors from foreign countries into the United States."). Also, an 1855 bill preventing the
immigration of criminals and paupers failed in the Senate due to objections by states' rights
advocates claiming that to be a state prerogative. See LOsT CENTURY, supra note 17, at
1859.
114. Articles of Confederation (1781), art. IV, 1 1.
115. The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 426 (1849) ("such persons are not
within the regulating power which the United States have over commerce. Paupers,
vagabonds, and fugitives never have been subjects of rightful national intercourse, or of
commercial regulations, except in the transportation of them to distant colonies to get rid
of them.") (separate opinion of Wayne, J.). See New York v. Miln, 36 U.S (11 Pet.) 102;
The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884).
116. The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 426-27.
117. Responding to the argument that "the State can remove all persons who are
thought dangerous to its welfare... [and has] the right to determine who shall enter the
State," Justice Wayne stated: "the discretion of a State of this Union to determine what
persons may come to and reside in it, and what persons may be removed from it, remains
unproved." Id.
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back on the history of state regulation, that nexus now seems ines-
capable. For instance, nineteenth century attempts by southern states
to exclude black seamen on foreign vessels not only drew loud pro-
tests and litigation from Britain, but Washington's inability to abate
the state immigration laws necessitated the Crown having to under-
take diplomatic negotiations with the states directly.118 California's
exclusion of Chinese immigrants at the turn of the century created
diplomatic difficulties with the Emperor and led to overseas boycotts
of American goods." 9 Similarly, California's nativist laws directed at
persons of Japanese ancestry required the personal intervention of
Theodore Roosevelt to avoid endangering friendly relations with Ja-
pan. This mediation was only briefly successful, as California shortly
renewed its animosity towards Japanese aliens. This revived the inter-
national crisis and became a specific topic of negotiations at the Ver-
sailles Peace Conference that concluded World War J.120 Yet,
California persisted in its persecution of Japanese aliens, poisoning re-
lations between the United States and Japan for years. According to
George Kennan and other historians, the California laws were a con-
tributing factor in Japan's entry into World War 11.121
The history of state immigration laws is a history of intrusion into
the exclusively federal domain of foreign policy. Although states have
strong interests in protecting community resources and communitar-
ian values, they have no enforceable interest in regulating immigra-
tion or aliens. Because immigration policy is inextricably tied to the
conduct of foreign relations, it is a matter of exclusive federal control.
This is not to suggest that states are powerless to affect immigra-
tion policy. They fully participate in the national deliberative process
through their representation in Congress and in the public debate."~
They may even use legislative and judicial means to "send a message
to Congress." For instance, two states have recently sued the federal
government, demanding more effective enforcement of federal immi-
gration laws.' 23 Although these suits were unsuccessful, they were
118. See LOST CENTURY, supra note 17, at 1876.
119. See Declaration of Prof. Gordon Chang (Stanford Univ.) in Gregorio T. v. Wilson,
CV 94-7652 MRP (C.D. Cal, 1994), on file with the author.
120. Id.
121. Id.; Declaration of Prof. Yuji Ichicka (UCLA) in Gregorio T., on file with the
author.
122. Cf. Garcia v. San Antonio Mun. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
123. See Chiles v. United States, 94-C676-CIV-Davis (S.D. Fla, 1994), dismissed Dec.
20, 1994; State of California v. United States, 94-0674 K (S.D. Cal. 1994), dismissed
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correct in asserting that the responsibility over immigration lies with
the federal government, not the states.12 4
II. The "Dormant Immigration Clause"
A. Plenary Federal Power
The Constitution vests in the federal government the power to
make "an uniform Rule of Naturalization,"'15 and, by extension, the
power to regulate immigration. 26 Because "this whole subject has
been confided to Congress by the Constitution,"' 7 immigration "is
unquestionably exclusively a federal power."' 28 A like result would
obtain even without so clear a constitutional grant, since the right to
control immigration inheres in national sovereignty. 29 As a result,
''over no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more
complete than it is over the admission of aliens." 30
The corollary of this plenary and exclusive federal power is that
states are powerless to regulate immigration. Control over immigra-
tion is neither a retained power, nor one recognized in the states by
124. See also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,242 (1982) ("A state has no power to prevent
unlawful immigration, and no power to deport illegal aliens, those powers are reserved
exclusively to Congress and the Executive. If the Federal Government, properly charged
with deporting illegal aliens, fails to do so, it should bear the burdens of their presence
here.") (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See also Note, Unenforced Boundaries: Illegal Immigra-
tion and the Limits of Judicial Federalism, 108 HARV. L. REv. 1643 (1995).
125. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4.
126. See Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1876). Federal power to regulate immigra-
tion is also derived from the Commerce Clause and its several foreign affairs powers.
127. Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259 (1875). See also The Passenger
Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 427 ("the constitutional obligations of the States of this Union
to the United States, in respect to commerce and navigation and naturalization, have quali-
fied the original discretion of the States as to who shall come and live in the United
States.") (separate opinion by Wayne, J.).
128. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976).
129. "It is an accepted maxim of international law that every sovereign nation has the
power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance
of foreigners within its dominions, or to admit them only in such cases and upon such
conditions as it may see fit to prescribe." Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892).
Control over immigration is "inherent in national sovereignty, necessary for maintaining
normal international relations and defending the country against foreign encroachments
and dangers-a power to be exercised exclusively by the political branches of govern-
ment." Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765 (1972). See also Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S.
787, 795 (1977) ("We are dealing here with an exercise of the Nation's sovereign power to
admit or exclude foreigners in accordance with perceived national interests."); Fong Yue
Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893). Professor Henkin criticizes the Court's em-
brace of so strong an inherent power. See United States Sovereignty, supra note 79, at 858.
130. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787,792 (1977) (quoting Oceanic Navigation Co. v. Strana-
han, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909)).
the Constitution. Accordingly, any entry by states into this realm nec-
essarily invades federal power, whether it is affirmatively exercised or
not. Since immigration is plainly "a matter of national moment, ''131
state interference is not tolerated. 32
This proposition is sometimes viewed as an extension of standard
preemption doctrine. Ordinarily, positive federal law preempts states
only where Congress explicitly declares or where some incompatibility
is found between state and federal enactments or objectives. How-
ever, if Congress fully occupies the field, supplemental (even harmoni-
ous) state law is forbidden.13 3  Where federal power is not only
plenary but also exclusive, it may be said that Congress "occupies the
field" whether or not it exercises that power.' 4 Thus, even when con-
gressional power lies "dormant,"' 135 states may not regulate in that ex-
clusive area. Judicial enforcement of that exclusion "safeguards
Congress' latent power from encroachment by the several States.' 3s6
Thus, there are two closely-related constitutional bases for a dor-
mant immigration clause doctrine: 37 states have no power over immi-
gration, and the exercise of any power they might possess interferes
with federal power. The first is a sort of "negative preemption" as
found with the dormant Commerce Clause. No affirmative congres-
sional enactment is necessary in order for state law to violate the
Supremacy Clause. The second is an extension of regular preemption
131. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 73 (1941) ("[T]he treatment of aliens, in
whatever state they may be located, [is] a matter of national moment.").
132. See, eg., Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
133. Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624,633 (1973); Florida Lime & Avo-
cado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
134. See American Trucking Assn. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167,202 (1990) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring) ("When we prohibit a certain form of state regulation that does not conflict with any
federal statute, we are saying, in effect, that we presume from Congress' silence that, in the
exercise of its commerce-regulating function, it means to prohibit state regulation.") (cita-
tion omitted); Guss v. Utah Labor Bd., 353 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1957) ("'where federal power has
been delegated but lies dormant and unexercised,' the States' power to act with respect to
matters of local concern is not necessarily superseded. But in each case the question is one
of congressional intent.") (citations omitted).
135. The notion of "dormant" constitutional power was first used in Wilson v. Black
Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245,252 (1829) (state action was not "repugnant to
[Congress'] power to regulate commerce in its dormant state").
136. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 154 (1982) (explaining theory of
dormant Commerce Clause). See also San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359
U.S. 236 (1959) (failure of the National Labor Relations Board to assert jurisdiction did
not leave the states power over activities they otherwise would be preempted from
regulating).
137. Other commentators have used the same or similar terms to describe preclusion of
state laws in foreign affairs. See, e.g., State Activism, supra note 11, at 14; Luis Li, State
Sovereignty and Nuclear Free Zones, 79 CAL- L. REv. 1169, 1174 (1991).
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doctrine. Starting with the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952
(INA), 38 Congress has so completely occupied the field of immigra-
tion that there is no room for supplemental state regulation. 139
Ordinarily "we start with the assumption that the historic police
powers of the States were not to be superseded by [a] Federal Act
unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.' 140 How-
ever, where the matter is one of traditional federal (instead of state)
control, that assumption does not apply. These are areas "in which
the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be as-
sumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject."' 4 '
This includes immigration, where the Court has "recognized the pre-
eminent role of the Federal Government with respect to the regula-
tion of aliens within our borders." 42 Accordingly, in matters of
immigration, the presumption is reversed and any overlap between
federal and state laws may result in preemption of the latter.' 43 At the
very least, courts "may rely upon the logic of the constitutional struc-
ture to resolve matters of national-state conflict in foreign affairs.
Neither actual interference with national decision making nor direct
conflict with existing national policy need be demonstrated."'"
138. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1988).
139. See De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351,356 (1976) ("there are situations in which state
regulation, although harmonious with federal regulation, must nevertheless be invalidated
under the Supremacy Clause"); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66 (1941) ("[w]here the
federal government, in the exercise of its superior authority in this field, has enacted a
complete scheme of regulation and has therein provided a standard for the registration of
aliens, states cannot, inconsistently with the purpose of Congress, conflict or interfere with,
curtail or complement, the federal law, or enforce additional or auxiliary regulations.").
140. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). In these circumstances
there must be compelling evidence of congressional intent to preempt. San Diego Bldg.
Trades, 359 U.S. at 244. See also California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S.
272, 281 (1987) ("preemption is not lightly presumed").
141. City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 633 (1973) (quoting
Rice, 331 U.S. at 230 (1947)). See also Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497,501-02 (1956);
cf. North Dakota v. United States, 460 U.S. 300 (1983).
142. Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 10 (1982). See also Hines, 312 U.S. at 68 (preemption
may be inferred from the nature of the subject matter).
143. "[I]t is of importance that this [alien registration] legislation is in a field which
affects international relations, the one aspect of our government that from the first has
been most generally conceded imperatively to demand broad national authority. Any con-
current state power that may exist is restricted to the narrowest of limits; the state's power
here is not bottomed on the same broad base as is its power to tax." Hines, 312 U.S. at 68.
See also Benke, The Doctrine of Preemption and the Illegal Alien: A Case for State Regula-
tion and a Uniform Preemption Theory, 13 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 166, 168 (1975) [hereinafter
Preemption and the Illegal Alien]. But see De Canas, 424 U.S. at 356-62 (declining to pre-
sume preemption of state law prohibiting employment of illegal aliens).
144. Harold G. Maier, Preemption of State Law: A Recommended Analysis, 83 AM. J.
INT'L L. 832, 836 (1989) [hereinafter Recommended Analysis].
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B. Preserving a Role for the States - Accommodation and Balance
Despite the strength of federal supremacy over immigration, its
breadth is less certain. In our federal system, states have legitimate
local concerns which ought not to be easily foreclosed by judicial in-
tervention. The role and separate identity of states requires that their
interests be respected, even in some instances where their laws have
demonstrable impact on federal interests. Thus, state laws may be
valid even though "involving matters of significant concern to foreign
relations."'145 Similarly, some latitude must be afforded states respect-
ing aliens lest they find themselves ousted from broad areas of regula-
tion. Otherwise, for instance, states could not apply generally
applicable civil and criminal law to aliens within the jurisdiction be-
cause of potential external effects.'4 6 Therefore, "standing alone, the
fact that aliens are the subject of a state statute does not render it a
regulation of immigration.' 47
The Supreme Court has recognized the need to accommodate lo-
cal and national power over aliens. But its efforts to mediate the
power struggle with doctrinal rules have been only partly successful.
At the threshold, the Court has drawn a distinction between state laws
that "impinge on foreign relations only 'incidentally or indirectly' and
those that do so directly or purposefully.' 148 A similar dichotomy ap-
plies to state regulations affecting aliens. If "local regulation has some
purely speculative and indirect impact on immigration, it does not
thereby become a constitutionally proscribed regulation of
immigration.' ' 49
Were that all there was to the analysis-whether a state law af-
fecting immigration was labeled "direct" or "indirect"-then the doc-
trine would be simple, but principled application would prove elusive
as it has in other areas relying on that dichotomy.5 0 In Justice Frank-
145. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 2 cmt. d (1965).
146. Local legislation inevitably has some incidental effect on international law. See In
re Alien Children's Educ. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 544, 596 (S.D. Tex. 1980) ("International law
traditionally comprehends a nation's treatment of aliens. Every act which adversely affects
an alien, however, does not contravene customary international law.").
147. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 355 (1976).
148. FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 5, at 241.
149. De Canas, 424 U.S. at 355-56.
150. Courts in dormant Commerce Clause cases have been accused of making the dis-
tinction "simply as a matter of intuition;" South Central Timber Dev. v. Wunnicke, 467
U.S. 82, 102 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Although the distinction requires that a
"line [must] be drawn" somewhere (South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 456
(1905)), the Court cannot always tell where. Indeed, it was just this problem that invited
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furter's words, such federalistic distinctions "are of a Delphic na-
ture."'' They mask more subtle analyses of respective state and
federal interests. The distinction is an important one, to be sure, in
reviewing state immigration laws, yet it is incomplete. Not only are
direct state regulations of immigration forbidden, but also state laws
purportedly aimed at local concerns which, nonetheless, burden the
federal interest in, or control over, aliens and immigration. Laws im-
posing special burdens on aliens may be disguised attempts to affect a
forbidden regulation of entry and presence.152 Accordingly, state
alienage laws must be carefully scrutinized for their "indirect" effect
on immigration and foreign policy. For instance, state laws which are
offensive to foreign governments may bind the nation diplomati-
cally. 53 This is not to suggest that foreign governments can determine
the outcome of constitutional analysis, even when they undertake re-
taliatory measures against state actions they find offensive. 154 But it
does mean that courts need to consider whether a state alienage or
immigration law might complicate the nation's diplomatic or trade
relations.
Respect for legitimate local interests does not mean that states
can escape the preclusive effect of dominant federal power merely by
avoiding direct regulation of immigration. It would exalt form over
substance to suggest that states have a free hand in regulating persons
because of their alienage or immigration status, so long as they avoid
measures that literally deny them entry or repatriate them.
C. Borrowing an Illusive Model
The Court has announced what appears to be a straightforward
test for determining the preclusion of state law: a direct regulation of
immigration "is essentially a determination of who should or should
early state immigration laws. See LOsT CE ruRy, supra note 17, at 1893 ("The nineteenth-
century search for the mysterious line between the exercise of the police power and the
regulation of commerce left indeterminate room for state control of immigration.").
151. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 619 (1958).
152. See Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33,42 (1915) ("[t]he assertion of an authority to deny
to aliens the opportunity of earning a livelihood when lawfully admitted to the State would
be tantamount to the assertion of the right to deny them entrance and abode").
153. E.g., New York Times Co. v. City of New York Comm'n on Human Rights, 361
N.E.2d 963, 969 (N.Y. 1977) (invalidating ordinance prohibiting advertisements of employ-
ment opportunities in South Africa because it involved "inquir[ies] that might have been
considered offensive by the Republic of South Africa and which might have been an em-
barrassment to those charged with the conduct of our Nation's foreign policy.").
154. See Barclay's Bank v. Franchise Tax Bd., 114S. Ct. 2268,2283 n.22 (1994) (uphold-
ing California unitary tax despite the fact that "[t]he governments of many of our trading
partners have expressed their strong disapproval of California's method.").
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not be admitted into the country, and the conditions under which a
legal entrant may remain."'55 The test is easily stated, but it does not
cover the full range of proscribed state laws. Nor does it acknowledge
the balancing of state and local interests that takes place in many of
the cases. Instead, the Supreme Court seems to use a more complex
(albeit unarticulated) test not dissimilar to the one developed for the
dormant Commerce Clause.' 56 Under that doctrine, states may not
either 1) regulate interstate commerce purposefully or directly; 2) un-
duly burden the national interest in promoting free trade; or 3) dis-
criminate against interstate commerce. 57  A similar analytical
approach has emerged in this field.' 58
The symmetry between the dormant Commerce Clause and the
"dormant immigration clause" is due in part to the involvement of
foreign commerce in both.15 9 It is also due to the "national" nature of
the subjects. 160 Originalism provides an additional significant nexus-
the purpose in forming a "more perfect union" was to divest states of
obstructionist power, both over commerce and affairs of state, includ-
ing immigration.' 61 Reposing these powers in the central government
155. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 355 (1976).
156. Cf. Board of Trustees v. Mayor of Baltimore, 562 A.2d 720, 744 n.50 (Md. 1989)
("The question of whether state legislation intrudes upon the dormant foreign relations
power is closely related to the question of whether such laws violate the negative implica-
tions of Congress's [sic] power to regulate foreign commerce.").
157. See Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
158. See Federalism and Foreign Relations, supra note 13, at 299-300 (preemption by the
dormant Commerce Clause "in areas thought to require federal uniformity and responsi-
bility [provides] a parallel solution in the at least equally sensitive foreign relations area").
See also Recommended Analysis, supra note 144, at 834 (advocating a similar 3-part test).
159. Indeed, early cases on state power to regulate immigration relied on Congress'
commerce power for doctrinal analysis. See, e.g., Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92
U.S. 259, 270 (1875) ("the transportation of passengers from European ports to those of
the United States has attained a magnitude and importance far beyond its proportion at
that time to other branches of commerce. It has become a part of our commerce with
foreign nations, of vast interest to this country, as well as to the immigrants who come
among us to find a welcome and a home within our borders"); The Passenger Cases, 48
U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849).
160. See Henderson, 92 U.S. at 273 (regulation of "commerce with foreign nations must
of necessity be national in its character"). See also Bd. of Trustees, 562 A.2d at 752 ("the
concerns which underlie the foreign Commerce Clause are closely related to the concerns
underlying the limits on a state's authority to affect foreign policy. The purpose behind
both limitations is to prevent individual states from adversely affecting relations with for-
eign countries that are properly coordinated on a national level"); Cooley v. Board of
Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319 (1851) ("[Subjects which] admit of only one uniform
system, or plan of regulation, may justly be said to be of such a nature as to require exclu-
sive legislation by Congress.").
161. See Tr FEDERALIST No. 42 (James Madison) ("By the laws of several States,
certain descriptions of aliens, who had rendered themselves obnoxious, were laid under
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was necessary for us to coalesce into a nation, rather than remain a
confederation of states.162 The federal interest in these areas is so
strong that states are denied power to act, even where Congress re-
mains silent. "We need not await for an instance of actual conflict to
strike down a state law which purports to regulate a subject matter
which Congress simultaneously aims to control. The opportunity for
potential conflict is too great to permit the operation of the state
law."'1
63
This theory of constitutional preclusion of state immigration laws
was gaining strength until the mid-1970s. Although the Court had
never formally announced such a principle,' 64 Louis Henkin echoed a
widely-shared view that it had "become part of the Constitution."' 65
However, doctrinal development suffered a setback in 1976 in De
Canas v. Bica.166 In upholding a California law forbidding the em-
ployment of undocumented aliens, the Supreme Court stated that not
"every state enactment which in any way deals with aliens is a regula-
tion of immigration and thus per se pre-empted by [Congress'] consti-
tutional power, whether latent or exercised."' 67 Many commentators
viewed De Canas as redirecting the supremacy inquiry away from a
theory of "dormant" immigration powers and toward standard pre-
emption by positive law. 68
interdicts inconsistent not only with the rights of citizenship but with the privilege of resi-
dence .... Whatever the legal consequences might have been, other consequences would
probably have resulted, of too serious a nature not to be provided against. The new Con-
stitution has accordingly, with great propriety, made provision against them, and all others
proceeding from the defect of the Confederation on this head, by authorizing the general
government to establish a uniform rule of naturalization throughout the United States.").
162. "[O]ne of the principal reasons for summoning the Constitutional Convention of
1787 was to deal with the problems created by the degree of autonomy conferred on the
states in both domestic and foreign matters by the Articles." Recommended Analysis,
supra note 144, at 832.
163. Bethlehem Steel v. Board of Comm'rs, 80 Cal. Rptr. 800, 804 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969)
(quoting Purdy and Fitzpatrick v. State, 456 P.2d 645, 652 (Cal. 1969)).
164. The doctrine did have its advocates on the Court, however. See, eg., Zschernig v.
Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 443 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring) (relying on "the basic allocation
of power between the states and the nation" in finding a state foreign-beneficiary escheat
law unconstitutional).
165. FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 5, at 238.
166. 424 U.S. 351, 355 (1976).
167. 424 U.S. at 355.
168. See, eg., Robert S. Catz & Howard B. Lenard, The Demise of the Implied Federal
Preemption Doctrine, 4 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 295,306 (1977) [hereinafter Demise of Im-
plied Preemption]. See also Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 26 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
("Our decision in De Canas v. Bica, however, unarihbiguously forecloses any argument that
this power, either unexercised or as manifested in the Immigration and Nationality Act,
preempts the field of [state] regulations") (citation omitted).
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Reports of the doctrine's demise were premature. 169 First,
although not finding preclusion in that case, De Canas reaffirmed the
rule that states are powerless to directly regulate immigration. 170 Sec-
ond, the Court's holding is not necessarily incompatible with a "dor-
mant immigration clause" theory. If for no other reason, Congress
apparently authorized state action of the sort taken by California.
Congressional delegation of power to the states will bypass a dormant
powers claim.' 7' Third, hints of constitutional preclusion can be found
in subsequent cases. To the extent the Court has substituted other
doctrines (e.g., equal protection), it has found the going rough, and
often resorts to federal supremacy as a backup theory. 172 Finally, the
Court has preserved the distinction between direct and indirect state
regulation and has maintained federal exclusivity over the former.1 73
Consequently, a "dormant powers" theory remains a useful model for
analyzing state laws which have significant effect on federal immigra-
tion and foreign policy.174 Unfortunately, as with the dormant Com-
merce Clause, the doctrine can be elusive and its outcomes
unpredictable. 175
D. The Direct-Indirect Dichotomy
No matter what doctrinal permutations and refinements are al-
lowed, state laws regulating or uniquely burdening aliens generally re-
ceive close scrutiny. The first task in each case is to characterize the
nature of the state law: i.e., whether the state is predominantly regu-
lating national or local affairs. 76 If the latter, the question then be-
comes one of degree; whether the state's locally-directed law is
169. See Paul Wolfson, Preemption And Federalism: The Missing Link, 16 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 69, 75 n.32 (1988).
170. 424 U.S. at 354-55.
171. Congress has, in the past, delegated immigration authority to state officials. See,
e.g., Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879) (state judges had power under the naturalization
laws to admit aliens to citizenship).
172. See infra Section V.
173. See Toll, 458 U.S. at 1; Tayyari v. New Mexico State Univ., 495 F. Supp. 1365
(D.N.M. 1980).
174. None of this is to suggest that normal preemption doctrine should be ignored. If
Congress legislates on a matter also covered by state law, then Congress' active powers,
not merely its dormant ones, invoke the Supremacy Clause.
175. See American Trucking Ass'n v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167,203 (1990) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring) ("no body of our decisional law has changed as regularly as our 'negative' Commerce
Clause jurisprudence. Change is almost its natural state").
176. A law aimed at local concerns (e.g., health and safety) would at most have an
"indirect" or "incidental" effect on immigration. However, if the object of the state law
were one entrusted to the national government (e.g., admission of aliens), then it would be
virtually per se invalid as a "direct" regulation of immigration.
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nonetheless burdensome on national interests.177  Some cases are
easy, as where the state has an avowed purpose to regulate immigra-
tion,178 or where it cannot identify valid local interests. Others are
more difficult, as where both local and national interests are affected.
Here, the Court may examine the breadth of federal legislation in the
area, both to uncover preemptive federal law and to gauge the scope
of the federal interests affected. The more pervasive federal law is, or
the greater its incompatibility with state law, the less likely the latter
will survive. At this point, ordinary preemption doctrine and the the-
ory of preclusion by dormant federal power merge. Even where opin-
ions endeavor to distinguish these two theories of supremacy, it is
clear that both play a role in the decision. 79
A state law which avowedly regulates immigration is invalid per
se.' 80 Thus, the first question for any inquiry is whether a state law
directly regulates immigration or merely has an incidental effect on it.
The problem in distinguishing between direct and indirect regulation
of foreign affairs is illustrated by the conflicting decisions in Bethle-
hem Steel Corp. v. Board of Commissioners,'8' and K.S.B. Technical
Sales Corp. v. North Jersey Water Supply Commission." In the for-
mer, the court found California's "Buy-American" statute unconstitu-
tional because it "usurp[ed] ... the power of the federal government
to conduct foreign trade policy" and "ha[d] a direct impact upon for-
eign relations."' 8 3 In contrast, the court in K.S.B. found a similar New
177. Justice Rehnquist has stated: "neither Congress' unexercised constitutional power
over immigration and naturalization nor its exercise of that power in passing the INA pre-
cludes the States from enforcing laws and regulations that prove burdensome to aliens."
Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 27 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). But it is not the burden
on aliens that matters, rather the burden on federal interests.
178. Where the state's purpose is the same as Congress' as manifested in federal legisla-
tion, the state law may be preempted quite apart from any theory of constitutional preclu-
sion. See Scheneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 308-09 (1988) (Michigan law
governing natural gas rates preempted because an existing federal scheme was "directed
at" the identical problem and was enacted for the same "central purpose"); Hines v. Da-
vidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 61 (1941) (state law preempted where the "basic subject of the state
and federal laws is identical").
179. See, e.g., Hines, 312 U.S. at 64-66.
180. Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1876); The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S.
581 (1889).
181. 80 Cal. Rptr. 800 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969).
182. 381 A.2d 774 (N.J. 1977), appeal dismissed, 435 U.S. 982 (1978).
183. Bethlehem Steel, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 803, 805. It should be noted that California's
"Buy-American" statute, invalidated in Bethlehem Steel, was modeled after similar federal
legislation. See Buy American Act, 41 U.S.C. § 10a (1965), 63 Stat. 1024; Exec. Order No.
10,582, 19 Fed. Reg. 8723 (1954). Its harmony with federal law was insufficient to save it
'because the state had still intruded upon an area of exclusive federal concern.
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Jersey statute valid because it did not have "a significant and direct
impact upon foreign affairs."'" Since the directness of impact can be
dispositive, yet often difficult to ascertain, it is not surprising that dif-
ferent results obtain in similar cases.
One way to tell whether a state law is a direct or indirect regula-
tion of immigration is by looking at its purpose. Where the legislature
candidly acknowledges an objective to control the influx of aliens, or
to regulate their residency within the state, then "direct" regulation is
found. 85 In contrast, where a plausible local objective is convincingly
stated, such as health and safety or conservation of state resources,
then any impact on aliens would be considered "indirect" or inciden-
tal. 86 The latter does not provide talismanic state immunity, for al-
most any law can be couched in terms of legitimate local concern.
Indirect immigration laws are also invalid where the local interest is
illusory or poorly served, or where the impact on federal interests is
substantial.
Other indicators of direct regulation are a statute's "history and
operation."'18 7 For instance, a law passed in response to policies of the
federal government or foreign nations, with which the state disagrees,
is an usurpation of national prerogative.' 88 Similarly invalid are laws
designed to "cure" defects in federal policy or enforcement. 189 If state
law directly regulates immigration, it is invalid no matter how great
the state's interests. Power does not spring from interest or need,
even great interest or great need.' 90
184. 381 A.2d at 784. The court also found that the state was acting as a market partici-
pant and was therefore immune from constitutional preclusion. Id. at 788.
185. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 355 (1976).
186. Compare Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307 (1925), with Bradley v. Pub. Utilities
Comm'n, 289 U.S. 92 (1933). In the former, the denial of a common carrier license was
declared violative of the dormant Commerce Clause because the state's purpose was to
regulate interstate competition. In the latter, a similar denial was upheld because the
state's purpose was to prevent overuse of congested highways.
187. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429,432 (1968); See also Board of Trustees v. Mayor
of Baltimore, 562 A.2d 720, 745 (Md. 1989) (quoting Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 432).
188. In Zschernig, Oregon amended its succession laws to prevent inheritance by na-
tionals of Nazi Germany and communist countries. Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 429. The
Supreme Court stated the Oregon statute "seems to make unavoidable judicial criticism of
nations established on a more authoritarian basis than our own." Id.
189. See Tayyari v. New Mexico State Univ., 495 F. Supp. 1365 (D.N.M. 1980) (invali-
dating exclusion of Iranian students from state university in response to taking of Ameri-
can hostages).
190. See Henderson v. New York, 92 U.S. 259,271 (1875) ("whatever may be the nature
and extent of [states' police] power, where not otherwise restricted, no definition of it, and
no urgency for its use, can authorize a State to exercise it in regard to a subject-matter
which has been confided exclusively to the discretion of Congress by the Constitution").
Summer 19951
968 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 22:939
III. Direct Regulation of Immigration
A. Alien Registration and Exclusion Laws
States no longer have their own immigration officers, although
they once did.' They also no longer have their own alien exclusion
and registration laws. These are clear examples of direct regulation of
immigration forbidden to the states. This issue was first considered in
Mayor of New York v. Miln.192 State law required the master of a ship
carrying aliens into the state, and the aliens themselves, to report their
presence and give bond as security against their becoming a public
charge. The Supreme Court upheld the law on a Commerce Clause
challenge. Justice Story 93 vigorously dissented, stating that the law
was a direct regulation of commerce. 194 Subsequently, the law came
before the Court on at least three other occasions. The reporting re-
quirement was again upheld in the Passenger Cases,95 but taxes im-
posed on the passengers were held an invalid regulation of foreign
commerce. Both that case and Miln were re-examined in Henderson
v. Mayor of New York, 1 9 6 which found all aspects of the state immigra-
tion law unconstitutional. Quoting language from dormant Com-
merce Clause cases, the Court found that immigration required "a
uniform system or plan" of regulation beyond the power of any
state. 97 Since that included alien registration, states could not act
even if Congress were silent. The Court reaffirmed its holding a few
years later in New York v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, inval-
idating a state alien inspection law. 198
State alien registration laws re-emerged during and after both
World Wars.199 A modem version was reviewed by the Supreme
191. See Henderson, 92 U.S. at 260; Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 276 (1875).
Apparently, some state immigration officers were under contract with the United States.
See Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 656, 661 (1892) (describing authority of Secretary
of the Treasury to contract with commissioner of immigration for the State of California).
192. 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837).
193. And Justice Marshall posthumously; he died between the first and second argu-
ments in the case, but had made his views known to Justice Story.
194. Miln, 36 U.S. at 161. Miln was later attacked as not having commanded a majority
of the Court. See The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 429 (1849) (separate opinion
of Wayne, J.).
195. 48 U.S. at 283. The Passenger Cases was a consolidation of an action involving the
New York registration law (Smith v. Turner) and a similar action involving Massachusetts
law (Norris v. City of Boston).
196. 92 U.S. 259 (1875).
197. Id- at 273.
198. 107 U.S. 59 (1883).
199. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. tit. 59 (1930), § 6042; FLA. COMp. GEN. LAWS § 2078
(1927); IOWA CODE (1939) § 503; LA. GEN. STAT. tit. 3, § 282 (Dart, 1939), 1917 La. Acts
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Court in Hines v. Davidowitz.2°° The Pennsylvania Alien Registration
Act required every alien within the state to carry a state identification
card. After its enactment, but prior to consideration by the Supreme
Court, Congress adopted its own systematic regime of alien registra-
tion.2 ' Broadly describing the breadth of federal power, the Court
held the state law preempted. Yet, it expressly did not decide whether
Pennsylvania's law would have been invalid in the absence of federal
legislation.20 2
Hines is best known for its vast expansion of field preemption,
that branch of preemption doctrine that denies state authority when-
ever Congress has legislated in the area.203 It appears that preemption
was a convenient but not necessary basis for the decision. The federal
alien registration law did not expressly preempt nor conflict with the
Pennsylvania law. Nor did the Court undertake an examination of
congressional intent or legislative history to find implied preemption.
Rather, because the state law regulated a matter entrusted to para-
mount federal power, preemption was presumed.2°
The Court should have taken the preclusion issue head on in
Hines, and ruled that state registration and exclusion laws are uncon-
stitutional whether or not Congress acts. At the very least, since
states are powerless to regulate interstate migration, it would be curi-
ous that they had such power over international migration. In Ed-
wards v. California,°5 the Supreme Court invalidated a California law
that proscribed "bringing into the state any indigent person who is not
a resident of the state. ''2°6 On its face, the law applied to aliens as well
as to residents of other states, although it was only in the latter con-
20, Ex. Sess.; ME. REv. STAT. ch. 34, § 3 (1930); N.H. PUB. LAWS ch. 154 (1926); N.Y.
[EXEc. LAW] § 10 (Consol.). Other states passed registration laws sometime later. See e.g.,
1940 S.C. Acts No. 1014, § 9, p. 1939; N.C. Code §§ 193(a) to 193(h) (1939). Some munici-
palities did as well. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 61 (1940).
200. Hines, 312 U.S. at 62.
201. Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140, 144 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(1988).
202. Hines, 312 U.S. at 62.
203. See S. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican Values, 71
B.U. L. REv. 685, 739-40 (1991).
204. Id. at 741. ("The Court emphasized that the state statute implicated the foreign
affairs power, thus producing the consequence that Congress merely had to act on the
subject for its statute to be deemed generously preemptive.").
205. 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
206. Id. at 161. Such laws had earlier been upheld in Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. (14
How.) 13, 18 (1853) ("a State has a right to make it a penal offence to introduce paupers,
criminals, or fugitive slaves, within their borders, and punish those who thwart this policy
by harboring, concealing, or secreting such persons").
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text in which the case was decided. The Court held the law to be "an
unconstitutional barrier to interstate commerce.120 7 Yet, California
could no more bar non-resident aliens, including indigent aliens,2 °8
than it could non-resident citizens.20 9 Just as our constitutional struc-
ture prohibits states from restricting domestic immigration,21 it simi-
larly denies state power over immigration from abroad.21 1 Not only
are states preempted from the field,212 they are constitutionally pre-
cluded. States may not decide who shall live within their borders be-
cause the exercise of such a power is a core manifestation of
sovereignty not available to them under the Constitution.
B. State Deportation Laws
States have also had their own deportation laws. In Chy Lung v.
Freeman,2 13 the Court considered "a most extraordinary statute, 2 1 4
under which the California Supreme Court ordered several Chinese
immigrant women deported because they were "lewd and de-
207. Edwards, 314 U.S. at 173. Four members of the Court would have invalidated the
law as a violation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Art. IV. For instance, Justice
Jackson was reluctant to treat human beings as commerce. Id. at 182. See also New York
v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 107 U.S. 59, 62 (1883) ("We conclude that free
human beings are not imports or exports, within the meaning of the Constitution").
208. Although the Supreme Court left this question open in Henderson, because indi-
gent aliens were seen as a danger to the community, later cases have clarified the lack of
state power. In a similar vein, states cannot bar entry of dangerous commerce any more
than they can of beneficial commerce. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
209. See The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849); The Chinese Exclusion
Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889). See also Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 85 (1986) ("there is little,
if any, basis for treating persons who are citizens of another State differently from persons
who are citizens of another country"); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915); United States v.
Hanigan, 681 F.2d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 1982) (movement of aliens across border constitutes
"commerce" within the meaning of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1976)).
210. Crandall v. State of Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867). A right to interstate
migration devolves from several constitutional provisions: the Commerce Clause, the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause, and the basic federal structure.
211. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976). If the California law in Edwards was inva-
lid under the dormant Commerce Clause because it intruded on federal power over inter-
state commerce, it would not be saved if that commerce had been international, rather
than interstate. Indeed, Congress' plenary power over foreign commerce tolerates lesser
state interference than does its power over interstate commerce. Barclay's Bank v.
Franchise Tax Bd., 114 S.Ct. 2268 (1994).
212. States "can neither add to nor take from the conditions lawfully imposed by Con-
gress upon admission, naturalization and residence of aliens in the United States or the
several states." Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 419 (1948).
213. 92 U.S. 275 (1875).
214. Id. at 277.
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bauched.'215 The Court, justly concerned about the foreign policy
ramifications,216 found the law unconstitutional.
Modem state deportation laws are more subtle and sophisticated
than their nineteenth century antecedents. Rather than affect a de-
portation directly, they might induce "voluntary departure" or pres-
sure federal authorities to do the job. An example of this is provided
by the 1994 California initiative, Proposition 187. Among its provi-
sions is a requirement that whenever any law enforcement officer or
other state or local employee encounters a "suspected illegal alien,"
they must "notify the person of his or her apparent illegal immigration
status, and that the person must either obtain legal status or leave the
United States. 2 1 7
This is not meant as friendly advice. Rather, it puts an entire
state apparatus behind a directive to depart the country. Official writ-
ten notification is coupled with the denial or withdrawal of a panoply
of benefits, from education to health care. This badge and display of
state authority has the avowed purpose and obvious practical impact
on an order of deportation.21 8 Persons unschooled in the intricacies of
immigration law may be induced to leave the country, rather than pur-
sue available opportunities for residency or other legal rights.219 In
practice, the state's directive to "leave the United States" is similar to
215. Id. at 276. The state had so little confidence that its law would survive that it did
not defend it before the Supreme Court. "We regret very much, that, while the Attorney-
General of the United States has deemed the matter of such importance as to argue it in
person, there has been no argument in behalf of the State of California, the Commissioner
of Immigration, or the Sheriff of San Francisco, in support of the authority by which plain-
tiff is held a prisoner; nor have we been furnished even with a brief in support of the
statute of that State." Id. at 277.
216. "[I]f citizens of our own government were treated by any foreign nation as subjects
of the Emperor of China have been actually treated under this law, no administration
could withstand the call for a demand on such government for redress ... can any one
doubt that this matter would have been the subject of international inquiry... ?" Id. at
279.
217. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 10001.5(c)(2) (Deering Supp. 1995) (requiring investi-
gation and notification by "any public entity in this state" providing public social services).
See also CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 130(c)(2) (Deering Supp. 1995) (same for pub-
licly-funded health care); CAL. PENAL CODE § 834b(b)(2) (Deering Supp. 1995) (same for
"every law enforcement agency in California").
218. California Governor Pete Wilson, a proponent of the initiative, expressed his hope
that the measure would induce aliens to "self-deport." G. Raine, Wilson Leads Brown in
2nd Straight Poll in a Tight Race, S.F. EXAMINER, Sept. 23, 1994, at A4. "Self-deportation"
is in fact common among immigrants arrested by the INS, over 97.5% of whom agree to
voluntary departure. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1044 (1984).
219. A lawyer might understand that a state social worker and an INS agent have dif-
ferent constitutional powers, but most lay persons are unlikely to appreciate the
distinction.
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the archaic and discredited practices of banishment and conditional
pardon.30 Two centuries ago, Rhode Island adopted a similar policy
of coercing undesirable (i.e., poor) immigrants to leave. Rather than
deport them directly, the state merely ordered them whipped if they
failed to leave voluntarily. 2 ' California's solution may be less bar-
baric, but no less a regulation of immigration.222
Moreover, "suspicion" is simply insufficient grounds for any or-
der of deportation, let alone one from a state.2 23 The vagueness inher-
ent in such a term is magnified because of the complexity of federal
immigration law. Deportability is not a simple matter, nor one that
can be determined in a ministerial fashion.224 There are even a variety
of situations where the United States restricts departure of aliens.225
Accordingly, commands to leave the country can only come from the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) after a "special inquiry
officer [conducts] proceedings.., to determine the deportability of
an[ ] alien"' 226 and after the alien has exhausted all available remedies,
including an application for discretionary suspension of deporta-
tion.227 Yet, under California law, the formalities of the INA and NS
220. See generally LosT CENTURY, supra note 17, at 1844-45. A conditional pardon is
functionally similar to banishment; persons convicted of crimes are pardoned on the condi-
tion that they leave the state or the country. Id.
221. See LosT CENTURY, supra note 17, at 1857.
222. Such a departure would break the continuity of residence in the country needed
for various forms of relief. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1254 (suspension of deportation requires 7
years continuous physical presence); 1182(c) (1988) (same).
223. Cf. Gutierrez v. City of Wenatchee, 662 F. Supp. 821 (E.D. Wash. 1987) (local
police cannot detain individual solely on basis of suspicion of violation of immigration
law).
224. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S 202, 226 (1982) ("[a]n illegal entrant might be granted
federal permission to continue to reside in this country... [and because of] the discretion-
ary federal power to grant relief from deportation, a State cannot realistically determine
that any particular undocumented child will in fact be deported until after deportation
proceedings have been completed").
225. See, ag., 8 U.S.C. § 1185 (1988) (war or national emergency); 8 C.F.R. §§ 215.2
(1994) (departure prejudicial to interests of United States); 215.3(e) (military service);
215.3(f) (fugitive from justice); 215.3(g) (witness to a criminal case); 215.3(h) (investiga-
tions by public officials); 215.3j) (1994) (humanitarian restrictions). These policies, when
implicated, are undermined by state commands to depart the country.
226. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1988). The section further states that "[tihe procedure so pre-
scribed shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for determining the deportability of an
alien under this section." See also 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(1) (1988) and 8 C.F.R. § 287.1(c)
(1994) which vest authority in federal immigration officers to interrogate and detain indi-
viduals reasonably believed to be in the country unlawfully.
227. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1988). Applications for relief from deportation often take
months or years to adjudicate. During this time, applicants are permitted to remain in the
country, and may even be granted temporary employment authorization. See, eg., 8
C.F.R. 88 208.7, 274a.12(d) (1994).
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regulations are cumbersome irrelevancies that can be dispensed with
in favor of summary determinations by state employees.22 If a state
cannot encourage naturalization, because that is exclusively a federal
prerogative,22 9 it also cannot induce deportation.23 °
Another section of Proposition 187 requires public school offi-
cials to investigate the citizenship and immigration status of all pupils
and their parents.3 In the case of students unable to establish legal
residency, the school is to "accomplish an orderly transition to a
school in the child's country of origin."'1 32 State-mandated transfer of
an alien child to a school in her home country is a form of deportation.
Justice Holmes once defined deportation as "simply a refusal by
the government to harbor persons whom it does not want. '2 33 That
seems to well describe the sentiment of the foregoing laws and puts
them beyond the state's police power. They stand in contrast to state
requests for federal assistance. For instance, under recent agreements
between the federal government and the States of Florida and New
York, the INS has begun to deport alien felons in state prisons.- 4
Legislation was introduced in the 103rd Congress to codify federal au-
228. Under 8 C.F.R. § 242.1(a) (1994), "[e]very proceeding to determine the de-
portability of an alien in the United States is commenced by the filing of an Order to Show
Cause with the Office of the Immigration Judge." The alien is given written notice advising
her of: (1) the nature of the proceedings; (2) the legal authority for the proceeding; (3) the
acts alleged to have given rise to deportability; and (4) the charges and statutory provisions
claimed to have been violated. INA § 242B, 8 U.S.C. § 1252b (1988). Every allegedly
deportable alien is entitled under the Fifth Amendment to a fair proceeding before being
instructed to depart the country. See Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953)
(aliens "may be expelled only after proceedings conforming to traditional standards of
fairness encompassed in due process of law"); The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86,
100 (1903); Ramirez v. INS, 550 F.2d 560,563 (9th Cir. 1977) (deportation proceeding must
include a "full and fair hearing").
229. See Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977) (encouraging naturalization was an im-
permissible purpose for a state since Congress had plenary authority in such matters). A
state cannot naturalize or denaturalize persons. Chirac v. Chirac, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 259,
269 (1817).
230. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 236 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (finding
constitutional infirmity in "any attempt to ... involve the State in the administration of the
immigration laws"); id. at 242 n.1 (Burger, CJ., dissenting) ("A state has no power to
prevent unlawful immigration, and no power to deport illegal aliens; those powers are re-
served exclusively to Congress and the Executive").
231. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48215(b)-(d) (Deering Supp. 1995).
232. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48215(f) (Deering Supp. 1995).
233. Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 591 (1913).
234. See Florida Will Deport Illegal Aliens Jailed for Nonviolent Crimes, N.Y. TIMES,
June 9, 1994, at A20; Ian Fisher, Pataki Announces Aliens' Expulsion, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 29,
1995, at Al.
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thority into law.235 Also, as part of Immigration Reform and Control
Act (IRCA), 36 Congress authorized payments to states to help with
the cost of incarcerating aliens.2 37 The State Criminal Alien Assist-
ance Program (SCAAP)238 provides fiscal relief to states affected by
large populations of criminal aliens in state correctional facilities.
These examples of "cooperative federalism" are one thing; state as-
sumption of federal immigration power is quite another. States may
neither deport aliens, nor effectuate their departure through unilateral
means.
In striking California's deportation law in Chy Lung, Justice
Miller asked, "If the [United States] should get into a difficulty which
would lead to war, or to suspension of intercourse, would California
alone suffer, or all the Union? '23 9 Justice Douglas answered that
question in United States v. Pink:240 "The nation as a whole would be
held to answer if a State created difficulties with a foreign power." 241
Deportation is a serious matter, often involving sensitive issues of for-
eign policy and diplomacy. 42 No state has the power to regulate or
bind the nation in such matters.
C. Enforcement of Federal Immigration Law
In contrast to implementing their own immigration policies, states
may support federal policy by enforcing federal laws. This might oc-
cur in the spirit of "cooperative federalism," as in the administration
235. See Criminal Aliens Federal Responsibility Act of 1994, 8 U.S.C. § 1365 (U.S.C.A.
1995). The bill would require the federal government to accept its responsibility for incar-
cerated aliens, either by putting them in federal prisons or by reimbursing states for the
costs of state and local incarceration. See also H.R. 3355 (1994) Violent Crime Control and
Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 140 CONG. Rc. S6018-02, § 2403, which would allow the
Attorney General to (A) "provide... compensation to the State or a political subdivision
of the State, as may be appropriate, with respect to the incarceration of... undocumented
criminal alien[s]" or (B) "take the undocumented criminal alien into the custody of the
Federal Government and incarcerate such alien."
236. Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986).
237. 8 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1988) ("Subject to the amounts provided in advance in appro-
priation Acts, the Attorney General shall reimburse a State for the costs incurred by the
State for the imprisonment of any illegal alien or Cuban national who is convicted of a
felony by such State").
238. 8 U.S.C. § 1365 (1988).
239. Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 279 (1875).
240. 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
241. Id. at 232.
242. Deportation can also implicate international law. See, e.g., United Nations Proto-
col Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223 (prohibiting the return
or refoulement of refugees).
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of joint federal-state benefits programs,243 or informally through the
sharing of information between state and federal authorities.2" State
law enforcement agencies also cooperate with INS through joint oper-
ations and by releasing persons in state custody to INS for deportation
proceedings.24 5 These cooperative ventures raise few if any federalism
concerns. The problem arises when states embark on unilateral pro-
grams of immigration enforcement. This appears in state enforcement
of federal law and state criminalization of federal immigration
offenses.
1. Enforcement of Civil Immigration Laws
In Gonzales v. City of Peoria,246 the Ninth Circuit held that states
could not enforce the civil provisions of federal immigration law.24 7 It
based its reasoning on preemption grounds-the pervasive federal
regulatory scheme relating to civil enforcement had occupied the field
to the exclusion of state authority.2' But preclusion of state power
goes beyond standard preemption doctrine; states cannot enforce im-
migration law because they have no power to do so. Enforcement
actions would impermissibly "involve the State in the administration
of the immigration laws.''49
State enforcement of federal immigration laws also presupposes
that local officials are competent to determine immigration status.
Whether an alien is "legal" or "illegal" depends upon a variety of fac-
tors beyond mere definitions contained in the INA. For instance,
243. See infra note 351.
244. See generally Maryellen Fullerton, Noah Kinigstein, Strategies for Ameliorating the
Immigration Consequences of Criminal Convictions: A Guide for Defense Attorneys, 23
AM. CRIM. L. REv. 425, 426 (1986); 2 CHARLES GORDON AND STANLEY MAILMAN, IMMI-
GRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE 2, § 44.04(3)(c) (1991). The INS also cooperates with
states in the verification of eligibility for benefits program. See, e.g., the SAVE program
("System of Alien Verification for Eligibility"), IRCA, § 121, 100 Stat. 3359, 3384-86
(1986).
245. See supra note 234. INS officials may put an "immigration hold" on persons in
state custody, thereby preventing their release until a transfer to INS custody can be
arranged.
246. 722 F.2d 468 (9th Cir. 1983).
247. Id. at 474-75. The court found that the civil enforcement provisions of the INA
were so comprehensive as to imply congressional occupation of the field and ouster of state
action. In contrast, the criminal enforcement scheme was not so pervasive as to exclude
state participation. See infra note 279 and accompanying text.
248. Gonzales, 722 F.2d at 475.
249. Plyler v. Doe, 427 U.S. 202,236 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring). The policy was
revised in 1983 by Attorney General William French Smith to permit joint federal-state law
enforcement operations, and to encourage assistance by state officials where they were
permitted to enforce federal law. Id.
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many persons without standard imniigration documents may nonethe-
less have a claim of right to residency, or may be in the process of
applying for asylum,250 adjustment of status,251 or relief from deporta-
tion.25 2 In addition to these statutory routes for changed status, INS
may simply use its discretion not to act against an otherwise deport-
able alien.253 Thus, "establishing [whether an individual] is not a resi-
dent or otherwise lawfully present in this country... could entail a
herculean task of reviewing voluminous documentation of separate
distinct governmental entities to determine whether a defendant has
received a visa, temporary or permanent resident alien status, etc."'25 4
The problem is complicated by the intricacies of the INA, which is
recognized as "second only to the Internal Revenue Code in complex-
ity,"255 and bears a "striking resemblance" to "Minos' Labyrinth in
ancient Crete. '11 6
As noted above, states may not adopt inspection, registration, or
deportation laws in the pursuit of their own immigration policies.
State investigation of immigration status raises similar problems. For
instance, under Proposition 187, local elementary and secondary
school officials are required to investigate the residency status of par-
ents,25 7 a fact which has no bearing on the education rights of chil-
250. See, e.g., INS Form 1-589 P 4 (Request for Asylum in the United States). The INS
generally does not commence departure proceedings until after an application is denied. 8
C.F.R. § 208.8(f)(4) (1985) (giving the district director discretion to grant voluntary depar-
ture or to commence deportation proceedings upon the denial of the applicant's request
for asylum).
251. 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1988).
252. See, eg., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1251(c) (waiver of grounds for deportation), 1253(h) (with-
holding of deportation to prevent persecution), 1254 (suspension of deportation), 1259
(1988) (revised record of admission). Under 8 C.F.R. § 242.17(a)(1994), immigration
judges are required to inform immigrants of "apparent eligibility" for relief from deporta-
tion where the record indicates a reasonable possibility of eligibility.
253. See, e.g., Antillon v. Dept. of Employment Sec., 688 P.2d 455 (Utah 1984) (deport-
able alien's "residence was ... under color of law because the INS knew of it and acqui-
esced in it by exercising its discretion not to enforce the law"); Holley v. Lavine, 553 F.2d
845 (2d Cir. 1977), cerL denied, 435 U.S. 947 (1978) (INS issued an official letter to undocu-
mented alien that, for humanitarian reasons, the agency did not contemplate enforcing her
departure).
254. People v. Adolfo, 275 Cal. Rptr. 619, 623 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990). Adolfo held that
because verification would so burden law enforcement agencies, the burden of establishing
legal status could be placed on the individual.
255. Castro-O'Ryan v. INS, 847 F.2d 1307, 1312 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing E. HULL, Wi--
OUT JUSTICE FOR ALL 107 (1985)).
256. Lok v. INS, 548 F.2d 37, 38 (2d Cir. 1977).
257. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48215(d) [Proposition 187, Section 7].
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dren. 58 Children may be citizens, even if their parents are
"illegal." 259 Also, under Proposition 187, investigation of immigration
status is required of persons providing public social services,26 public
health care services,2 61 elementary and secondary education,2 62 and
higher education.2 63 Nearly every public employee in the state has
been turned into an immigration officer with power to investigate,
provide immigration advice,264 report to the Attorney General and
INS, and "provide any additional information that may be re-
quested. '2 65 It is not uncommon for state authorities to notify immi-
gration authorities of aliens in their custody,2 66 but this law goes much
further than that. It requires state officers to undertake that investiga-
tion.267 In essence, California will have a hundred thousand junior
immigration officers,268 each one of them required to be fluent in im-
migration law and policy. Yet, "the structure of [federal] immigration
statutes makes it impossible for the State to determine which aliens
are entitled to residence, and which eventually will be deported. 2 69
Thus, under the guise of inviting cooperation with federal policies,
258. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982); Darces v. Woods, 679 P.2d 458 (Cal. 1984). See
also Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 647 (1948) (invalidating a law classifying a citizen
child on the basis of his father's alien status); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505 (1976)
(unfairness of penalizing illegitimate children for conduct of parents).
259. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof are citizens of the United States . . ."). See
Birthright Citizenship, supra note 112.
260. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 10001.5 (Section 5) (Deering Supp. 1995).
261. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 130 (Section 6) (Deering Supp. 1995).
262. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48215 (Section 7) (Deering Supp. 1995).
263. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 66010.8 (Section 8) (Deering Supp. 1995).
264. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 10001.5(c)(2) ("notify the person of his or
her apparent illegal immigration status, and that the person must either obtain legal status
or leave the United States").
265. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 53069.65 (Deering Supp. 1995).
266. See American G.I. Forum v. Miller, 267 Cal. Rptr. 371 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990), up-
holding CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 11369 ("When there is reason to believe that
any person arrested for violation of [certain narcotics offenses] may not be a citizen of the
United States, the arresting agency shall notify the appropriate agency of the United States
having charge of deportation'matters"); Gates v. Superior Court, 238 Cal. Rptr. 592, 600
(Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
267. Under federal Medicaid and AFDC programs, states are required to verify the
immigration status of all noncitizens seeking benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-7(a). But Con-
gress has established a verification process far different from that required under Proposi-
tion 187. See supra note 244.
268. See generally Maurice A. Roberts, Employers as Junior Immigration Inspectors:
The Impact of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act, 21 INT'L LAW. 1013 (1987).
269. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 236 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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state enforcement of the INA would invite errors and inevitably dis-
serve federal law.27
"Demanding documentation to indicate.., legal status"271 could
also frustrate the confidentiality provisions of the IRCA.272 Interro-
gation by local officials could also discourage lawful attempts by aliens
to obtain residency, asylum, and assert other legal rights. For in-
stance, under Proposition 187, this interrogation must be done by
"every law enforcement agency in California," including personnel
untrained for such tasks.27 The city dog catcher of National City,
California has already taken it upon himself to detain persons he be-
lieves are undocumented. 274 Yet, investigation of immigration status
by local police is often inaccurate and can have serious unintended
consequences. 275
Does interrogation of aliens by local police (and other civil ser-
vants) promote or at least have no effect on federal immigration and
foreign policies? Or does it substantially interfere with those policies?
The Supreme Court has answered these questions, stating that state
documentation laws "would subject aliens to a system of indiscrimi-
nate questioning similar to the espionage systems existing in other
lands.12 76 The demand that persons produce immigration documenta-
270. As has been justly observed, "[S]tate and local arrests for immigration violations
hinder the federal interest in uniform immigration enforcement." Cecilia Renn, State and
Local Enforcement of the Criminal Immigration Statutes and the Preemption Doctrine, 41
U. MIAMI L. REv. 999, 1024 (1987) [hereinafter Criminal Immigration Statutes].
271. CAL. PEN. CODE § 834b(b)(1) (Deering Supp. 1995) [Proposition 187].
272. 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(c)(5). These provisions provide that information submitted in
applications for legalization is confidential and is not available to any division of the De-
partment of Justice without the consent of the alien.
273. In contrast, "[INS] agents receive intensive instruction in immigration and natural-
ization law; are trained in the service operational tactics, and receive extensive field train-
ing. Those agents who will be operating near the United States-Mexican border are
required to be fluent in Spanish and are trained to be sensitive to the Mexican culture."
People v. Barajas, 147 Cal. Rptr. 195, 205 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) (Reynoso, J., dissenting).
274. City Sanctuary Resolutions and the Preemption Doctrine: Much Ado About Noth-
ing, 20 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 513, 558 n.225 (1987) [hereinafter City Sanctuary Resolutions].
275. "Police regularly ask about immigration status and check off the 'undocumented
person' box based on the arrestee's Hispanic appearance, command of English, and ac-
cent .... [Yet,] it is often impossible for police to determine the immigration status or
citizenship of many persons, either by soliciting such information, inspecting identification,
or by observation. This collection of information can result in a false record that an arres-
tee is an undocumented person. Due to entry into a national computer system, this infor-
mation can follow the arrestee throughout his life." American G.I. Forum v. Miller, 267
Cal. Rp'tr. 371, 373 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988). However, at least in California, these problems
are apparently outweighed by countervailing governmental interests. Loder v. Municipal
Court, 553 P.2d 624, 630-37 (Cal. 1976).
276. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 71 (1941).
tion to state officials "is thought to be a feature that best lends itself to
tyranny and intimidation." 27 For this reason, if no other, treatment of
foreign nationals is "one of the most important and delicate of all in-
ternational relationships."2 78
2. Enforcement of Federal Criminal Laws
Although state enforcement of the civil provisions of federal law
was held preempted in Gonzales, the court upheld state power to en-
force the criminal provisions of the INA.2 79 This authority means that
local police may arrest and detain (but not prosecute) persons sus-
pected of violating the criminal provisions of federal immigration law;
e.g., illegal entry or re-entry after deportation. 280 The court employed
standard preemption doctrine in reaching this result, finding no con-
gressional intent to limit enforcement to federal officers.2s8 The court
noted an identity of purpose between state and federal enforcement,
but did not consider whether state enforcement might nonetheless ob-
struct federal policies.'
As a general proposition, state and local police may,28 3 but need
not,2 4 enforce federal criminal law. This is usually accomplished in
277. Id. n.32.
278. Id. at 64. "State and local law enforcement officials should not have the authority
to stop, detain, interrogate, or arrest individuals solely on suspicion of an immigration vio-
lation. Unlike state and local enforcement of other federal criminal statutes, local arrests
for immigration violations do not necessarily effectuate federal policy." Criminal Immigra-
tion Statutes, supra note 270, at 1024.
279. 722 F.2d 468, 474-75 (9th Cir. 1983). The court found the criminal enforcement
scheme in the INA was not so pervasive as to exclude state participation. The same result
was reached in United States v. Salinas-Calderon, 728 F.2d 1298, 1301 n.3 (10th Cir. 1984),
and People v. Barajas, 147 Cal. Rptr. 195 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978). But other federal courts
have reached opposite conclusions. Velasquez v. Ackerman, Civ. No. C-84-20723 (N.D.
Cal. 1992) (consent decree) (described in Ignatius Bau, Comments by Ignatius Bau, 7 LA
RAZA L.J. 115 (1994) [hereinafter Comments of Bau]); Vivanco-Zepeda v. Fish, No. C82-
1199C (W.D. Wash. Jan. 13, 1984) (consent decree) (described in Criminal Immigration
Statutes, supra note 270, at 1003 n.21); Nunez v. Sanders, No. PB-C-82-228 (E.D. Ark. Dec.
18, 1983) (consent decree) (described in Criminal Immigration Statutes, supra note 270, at
1003 n.21).
280. Persons overstaying visas, etc., are at most civilly deportable. Local police may not
enforce immigration laws against them.
281. Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 475 (9th Cir. 1983).
282. Id. at 474.
283. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 31 (1963); Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301,305
(1958); United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 589 (1948).
284. Enforcement of other jurisdiction's criminal laws is not required either as a matter
of international law or federalism. See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
Summer 19951 STATE IMMIGRATION AND FEDERAL SUPREMACY
980 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 22:939
joint state-federal police actions." 5 It is rare for local police to under-
take such enforcement without federal participation, but it is pre-
sumed valid when it occurs. Is there anything about federal
immigration laws that counsel a different result? For one thing, crimi-
nal enforcement is direct regulation; its sole object is to implement
immigration statutes. Unlike narcotics trafficking, for instance, immi-
gration is not an area where state and federal governments have con-
current interests and power.28 6 Congress could, of course, delegate
enforcement powers to the states. Where it has done so, it is usually
pursuant to strict guidelines.2 1 But it has not done so regarding the
enforcement of federal immigration law.28 Indeed, in 1978 the Attor-
ney General requested state law enforcement agencies not to arrest
persons for immigration offenses. 28 9 Absent delegation and guidance,
state enforcement of federal law impedes federal control.
Formulation of public policy occurs not only in the enactment of
legislation, but in its enforcement as well.290 The procedures for ar-
rests and detention by local police, and their validity, are a function of
285. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 211 (1960) (describing the "entirely com-
mendable practice of state and federal agents to cooperate with each other in the investiga-
tion and detection of criminal activity").
286. There is a distinction between arrests for immigration offenses and arrests for
other criminal activity where immigration status is a relevant concern. Persons arrested for
ordinary criminal violations may be ineligible for bail, parole, or other considerations if
they are not likely to remain in the country. See Van Atta v. Scott, 613 P.2d 210,216 (Cal.
1980); People v. Sanchez, 235 Cal. Rptr. 264, 266 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987). The state has a
legitimate interest here. Other than for a bootstrapping argument, the state does not have
a similar interest in making arrests for immigration violations.
287. See generally Harold Krent, Legal Theory: Fragmenting the Unitary Executive:
Congressional Delegations of Administrative Authority Outside the Federal Government, 85
Nw. U.L. Rnv. 62, 81-82 (1990). See also 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (1988) (delegation of limited
authority to states regarding adjustment of alien status).
288. Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569,592 (E.D. Tex. 1978), affd sub nom. Plyler v. Doe,
457 U.S. 202 (1982).
289. 60 Interpreter Releases 172, 172-73 (Mar. 4, 1983).
"Attorney General [Griffin Bell] stated that the Department would continue to
urge state and local police forces to observe the following guidelines:
1. Do not stop and question, detain, arrest or place 'an immigration hold' on
any persons not suspected of crimes, solely on the grounds that they may be de-
portable aliens;
2. Upon arresting an individual for a non-immigration criminal violation no-
tify the Service immediately if it is suspected that the person may be an undocu-
mented alien so that the Service may respond appropriately.
INS officials will continue to work with state and local law enforcement officials
to carry out this policy."
Id-
290. See Criminal Immigration Statutes, supra note 270, at 1014-15 ("The police officer
on the street has considerable discretion and makes federal immigration policy every time
he stops, arrests, or ignores people who appear to be undocumented aliens").
STATE IMMIGRATION AND FEDERAL SUPREMACY
state law, even when enforcing federal criminal statutes.29' Police au-
thority and practices vary from state to state,2 92 and certainly from
federal operations.293 Criminal enforcement can also attract foreign
protest.294 Thus, unsupervised enforcement by local police not only
undermines the constitutional and pragmatic requirements for "uni-
form" immigration laws,295 it runs the risk of complicating the nation's
diplomatic relations.296 "Effectuation of federal immigration policy is
not a matter that can be left to the vagaries of state arrest and deten-
tion law nor to the discretion of the local police officer. '297
The perils of state enforcement of immigration laws is illustrated
by Gates v. Superior Court.98 Officers of the Los Angeles Police De-
partment (LAPD) detained a permanent legal resident for jaywalking.
After issuing a citation, the officers arrested and booked him on suspi-
cion of using a false alien registration receipt (green card), a federal
felony.299 They held the suspect without bail and turned him over to
INS officials two days later. An INS agent examined the suspect's
green card, found it to be valid, and ordered him released. Still, the
arresting officer testified that his inspections were to the contrary and
"would again arrest an individual presenting the card as genuine."3 °0
The court noted that LAPD arrest and detention procedures differed
from those of the INS. Yet, the court stated, "there is no reason why
the LAPD should provide a suspected illegal alien the same statutory
291. Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 305 (1958); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 37
(1963); Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 475 (9th Cir. 1983); Criminal Immigration
Statutes, supra note 270, at 1004 n.22.
292. Criminal Immigration Statutes, supra note 270, at 1002-03 n.20. Some states pro-
hibit their police from enforcing immigration statutes. See, e.g., OR. REv. STAT. § 181.850
(1) (1987 c.467 § 1) ("No law enforcement agency of the State of Oregon or of any political
subdivision of the state shall use agency moneys, equipment or personnel for the purpose
of detecting or apprehending persons whose only violation of law is that they are persons
of foreign citizenship residing in the United States in violation of federal immigration
laws"); Executive Order No. 257, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Executive Depart-
ment (Oct. 4, 1985) (gubernatorial order prohibiting state agencies from investigating citi-
zenship or residency status of any person) (cited in Peter L. Reich, Public Benefits for
Undocumented Aliens: State Law Into the Breach Once More, 21 N.M. L. REv. 219, 239
n.141 (1991) [hereinafter Public Benefits]).
293. See Criminal Immigration Statutes, supra note 270.
294. See supra notes 118-124.
295. Cf. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, 4.
296. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52,64 (1941) (treatment of foreign nationals is "one
of the most important and delicate of all international relationships").
297. People v. Barajas, 147 Cal. Rptr. 195, 212 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) (Reynoso, J.,
dissenting).
298. 238 Cal. Rptr. 592 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
299. 18 U.S.C. § 1426(b) (1994).
300. 238 Cal. Rptr. at 602.
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due process rights the INS must provide before deporting or excluding
such a person. "301
Rather than facilitate cooperation with federal officers and poli-
cies, state enforcement of immigration laws virtually assures obstruc-
tion of federal policies. For instance, alienage and lack of
identification alone are not enough to create a reasonable suspicion of
illegal entry under federal law.30 2 But it is not clear when such reason-
able suspicion arises under state law.30 3 A loose state "probable
cause" standard would seem to invite harassment of ethnic minorities
and other persons who "look foreign.' '304 Using state standards is also
problematic since "probable cause to suspect criminal immigration vi-
olations is difficult to distinguish from probable cause to suspect civil
violations. 30 5 Under federal law the two are closely related and may
overlap.30 6 Yet states cannot enforce civil immigration laws.30 7 The
dichotomy drawn in Gonzales between civil and criminal provisions is
supported neither by constitutional theory nor by the reality of the
INA.
Interrogation of suspected aliens by local police for immigration
violations could hamper federal investigations: by tainting evidence
301. 238 Cal. Rptr. at 599. See also 238 Cal. Rptr. at 600 ("it makes no sense to require
the LAPD, which concededly neither is nor should be involved in the admission, exclusion
or deportation of aliens, to abide by the same regulations applicable to INS agents in the
administration of these civil functions of the INA").
302. Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 476-77 (9th Cir. 1983).
303. Federal immigration officials are empowered to arrest aliens without a warrant (8
U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2) (1994)), but local police need probable cause. Gates v. Superior Court,
238 Cal. Rptr. 592, 597 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987). A warrantless arrest by local police could
easily jeopardize an otherwise valid prosecution. Moreover, "an INS agent must make two
determinations before taking an alien into custody for an immigration violation: alienage
and deportability" (Criminal Immigration Statutes, supra note 270, at 1006 n.26), but a state
officer need only have a suspicion of illegal entry.
304. This is apparently a common practice in areas that permit local immigration en-
forcement. For instance, in United States v. Mallides, 473 F.2d 859 (9th. Cir. 1973), an
Oceanside police officer "testified that he made it a practice to stop 'all cars with Mexicans
in them that appear to be sitting and packed in."' Id. at 860. Yet, the court observed, "[i]t
is impossible to determine from looking at a person of Mexican descent whether he is an
American citizen, a Mexican national with proper entry papers, or a Mexican alien without
papers." Id. The stopped suspect was not even of Mexican origin, but a naturalized citizen
born in Iraq. Id. n.1. The court sharply criticized the practice of stopping dark-skinned
persons, in the search for "illegal aliens," on the mere basis that they looked suspicious.
"The 'furtive gesture' syndrome has been overextended." Id. at 861 n.4.
305. Criminal Immigration Statutes, supra note 270, at 1005-06.
306. An alien who is "illegally present" in the country is committing a civil violation of
the immigration laws. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a) (1994). An alien who illegally enters the country
commits a misdemeanor. 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (1994).
307. See Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 476 (9th Cir. 1983).
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obtained or arrests made, by warning suspects, 308 by maintaining
physical custody,3°9 by sequestering documents,310 by communicating
with foreign governments,31' and by straining relations with them.312
Indeed, state laws of this sort have a penchant for heightening ten-
sions with foreign governments. 1 3 The relation of local enforcement
of immigration measures to foreign affairs is underscored when heads
of foreign states lodge official protests with the United States govern-
ment regarding the treatment of their nationals. Such protests have
been filed from time to time by foreign governments. A particularly
volatile situation erupted when federal authorities turned Cuban
emigres over to Florida for prosecution under the Florida Territorial
Waters Act.314 The lack of federal immigration laws for most of our
history illustrates the sensitivity of the issue and our national reluc-
tance to so encumber foreign relations.3"5
308. Proposition 187, § 834b(b)(2) requires state authorities to "notify [a suspected]
person of his or apparent status as an [unlawfully present] ... alien [and that] he or she
must either obtain legal status or leave the United States." This notification could alert
persons to potential problems with INS, thus thwarting their enforcement efforts. In
United States v. Rubio-Gonzalez, 674 F.2d 1067 (5th Cir. 1982), the Fifth Circuit ruled that
merely warning an alien of the presence of immigration officers and thereby aiding his
escape is within the scope of activity prohibited by the INA under 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(3).
Id. at 1072.
309. Gates v. Superior Court, 238 Cal. Rptr. 592 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
310. Section 9 of Proposition 187 (adding CAL. GOV'T CODE § 53069.65), which re-
quires the California Attorney General to "maintain[ ] on-going and accurate records of
... reports." Those reports consist of information obtained during investigation. This
could hamper the record keeping requirements of federal law.
311. The verification requirements of state law may require local law enforcement to
communicate with foreign governments, perhaps frustrating federal efforts to do so. Does
this communication require emissaries, agreements, technological arrangements? All are
constitutionally prohibited. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10. It "was one of the main objects of the
Constitution... to cut off all communications between foreign governments, and the sev-
eral state authorities." Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 575-76 (1840).
312. See New York Times Co. v. City of New York Comm'n on Human Rights, 361
N.E.2d 963, 969 (N.Y. 1977) (municipal ban on employment advertising for South Africa-
based companies was invalid because it "might have been considered offensive by the Re-
public of South Africa and ... an embarrassment to those charged with the conduct of our
Nation's foreign policy"). See also Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 279-80 (1875) ("can
any one doubt that [disrespectful treatment of foreign nationals] would... [be] the subject
of international inquiry, if not of a direct claim for redress? ... If we should conclude that a
pecuniary indemnity was proper as a satisfaction for the injury, would California pay it, or
the Federal government?").
313. See Federalism and Foreign Relations, supra note 13, at 251 n.17.
314. See Federalism and Foreign Relations, supra note 13, at 312-14 (describing the Act
as leading to reprisals by Fidel Castro and an investigation by the United Nations Security
Council).
315. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 70-72 (1941).
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3. State Criminal Immigration Laws
Even accepting the validity of state arrests for federal immigra-
tion offenses, it is another matter when states make immigration viola-
tions a separate state offense. For instance, Proposition 187 penalizes
the manufacture or use of false citizenship and immigration docu-
ments. 16 First, as a matter of ordinary preemption, these provisions
duplicate comprehensive federal law which does not admit of supple-
mentary state regulation.317 Second, the state sanctions were designed
to augment federal immigration laws. This creates a possible conflict
with federal jurisdiction and substantive law. Because the California
initiative creates new state offenses, persons may be held in custody
for state trial. Yet, a "person arrested [for immigration violations]
shall be taken without unnecessary delay before the nearest available
officer empowered to commit persons charged with offenses against
the laws of the United States. 31 8
False citizenship and immigration papers may be used to gain en-
try, or the fruits of entry, into the country. They include passports,
work permits, alien registration cards, and other federal documents
which are heavily regulated by Congress and federal agencies. 9
Under Proposition 187, the same activity prohibited by Congress is
now also a state offense. 2 Persons entering the United States
through California without proper documentation necessarily violate
state law.3 2 ' However, a state cannot criminalize immigration of-
fenses.32 Moreover, the state offense is a felony,32 while obtaining
entry by false or misleading representations is typically only a misde-
meanor under federal law.324
316. CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 113 and 114 (Deering Supp. 1995) [Prop. 187, Sections 2 and
3].
317. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324c (1994) (use of false documents to obtain benefits); 18 U.S.C.
ch. 75, ("Passports and Visas") commencing with § 1541; § 1542 (False statement in appli-
cation and use of passport); § 1543 (Forgery or false use of passport); § 1544 (Misuse of
passport) (1994).
318. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(4) (1994).
319. See 18 U.S.C. § 1426 (using a false or forged alien registration receipt card (green
card) is conduct subject to fines not more than $5000, or imprisonment not more than five
years, or both.).
320. Penal Code section 113 would make it a felony to manufacture, distribute or sell
documents concealing citizenship or alien status; section 114 would make it a felony to use
such documents. CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 113-114 (Deering Supp. 1995).
321. CAL. PEN. CODE § 114 (Deering Supp. 1995),
322. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62-68 (1941).
323. CAL. PEN. CODE § 114 (Deering Supp. 1995).
324. 8 U.S.C. § 1325(3) (1994). Aliens who enter the country illegally are both civilly
deportable under 8 U.S.C. § 1251 and subject to criminal charges under 8 U.S.C. § 1325.
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Such an overlap and inconsistency with federal authority is prob-
lematic at best. For which offense (federal or state) shall the individ-
ual be tried first? Does double jeopardy attach? If transactional
immunities are conferred, do they bind the other jurisdiction? What
rights does the apprehended suspect have? Due process constraints
on federal authorities enforcing national immigration laws may be
considerably different from those applicable to state criminal laws.325
These problems demonstrate that it is intolerable to have a state use
its criminal laws to regulate behavior subject to exclusive federal con-
trol, particularly in the area of immigration where uniformity is quin-
tessential.326 Misapplication of federal immigration law might also
injure relations with foreign countries.327
Laws making it a state offense to violate federal immigration stat-
utes are the modem version of state registration and exclusion laws.
The only reasons to do so are either dissatisfaction with the federal
government's enforcement of its own laws or to further burden immi-
gration. Neither is a legitimate local interest. In essence, because the
federal government isn't doing its job,32 states must step into the
breach. This is basically direct immigration regulation.329 "Measures
intended to increase or decrease immigration, whether legal or illegal,
are the province of the federal government. ' 330 While states can and
Reentry after deportation is a felony. 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (1994). Use of false immigration
documents to obtain benefits is a deportable felony. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(c)(d)(3) (1994).
325. This cuts both ways. On the one hand, the Supreme Court has stated a rule al-
lowing Congress discretion in granting due process for admission of aliens in contrast to
that applicable for government conduct generally. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753,
767 (1972); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954). Yet, at least one state court has indicated
that state enforcement of federal law would require even less due process. See Gates v.
Superior Court, 238 Cal. Rptr. 592, 600 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
326. See Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) § 115 P.L. 99-603; 100 Stat.
3384 (1986) ("It is the sense of Congress that the immigration laws of the United States
should be enforced vigorously and uniformly.").
327. New York Times Co. v. City of N.Y. Comm'n on Human Rights, 361 N.E.2d 963
(N.Y. 1977).
328. See e.g., Diaz v. Kay-Dix Ranch, 88 Cal. Rptr. 443, 449 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970)
("There are at least two prime areas of federal misfeasance. One is the apparent inade-
quacy of enforcement budgets for the border patrol of the Immigration and Naturalization
Service.... [Second], the Social Security Administration has been furnishing multitudes of
illegal entrants with a ticket of admissibility to American jobs-a social security card").
329. See id. at 451 ("Plaintiffs seek the aid of equity because the national government
has breached the commitment implied by national immigration policy. It is more orderly,
more effectual, less burdensome to the affected interests, that the national government
redeem its commitment.").
330. In re Alien Children Educ. Litig., 501 F.Supp. 544, 578 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
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sometimes do enforce federal immigration laws,33' they cannot dupli-
cate federal laws with their own.
D. Deterring Illegal Immigration
States may not regulate immigration directly by controlling entry.
Nor may they do so indirectly by imposing burdens on resident aliens,
for that would interfere with exclusive federal power over admission
to the country.332 State-imposed burdens on undocumented aliens,
however, would seemingly complement federal policy and provide a
supplemental means to deter illegal immigration. Is this a permissible
state objective?
If a state imposes burdens and penalties with the sole objective of
deterring illegal immigration, it adopts a purpose entrusted solely to
the national government. Federal policies might be ambiguous, as in
the case of immigrant workers.333 Or the means chosen by Congress
to control illegal immigration may be sensitive to other policies as
well, such as international obligations, humanitarian concerns, and la-
bor policy. For states to supplement federal law, even with the same
goal in mind, could easily complicate national goals. Accordingly, de-
terring illegal immigration, for its own sake, is not a legitimate state
interest.
This is not to suggest that states are precluded from adopting fed-
eral classifications in the pursuit of independent state objectives. A
state may endeavor to deter illegal immigration, not as an end of its
own, but as a means toward protecting traditional state concerns.334
Thus a state may exclude undocumented aliens from state programs
so long as interests within local purview are rationally promoted
thereby.335 To borrow a phrase, if aliens "constitute a peculiar source
of the evil at which [a state law] is aimed,' 336 it may legislate against
331. See, e.g., Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468 (9th Cir. 1983); People v.
Barajas, 147 Cal. Rptr. 195 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978). See generally Criminal Immigration Stat-
utes, supra note 270.
332. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 42 (1915).
333. See infra notes 409, 430 and accompanying text.
334. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,228 n.23 (1982) (citing De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351,
354-56 (1976)).
335. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 226.
336. United Bldg. & Constr. Trades v. Camden, 465 U.S. 208,222 (1984) (discussing test
under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV of the United States
Constitution).
STATE IMMIGRATION AND FEDERAL SUPREMACY
them, not to deter immigration per se, but to ameliorate the impact
they cause.337
Additionally, states may follow federal direction in the treatment
of aliens, thus assisting Congress in its efforts to control illegal immi-
gration.338 "[U]ndocumented status, coupled with some articulable
federal policy, might enhance state authority with respect to the treat-
ment of undocumented aliens. 339 Still, the objective of controlling
illegal immigration is one for Congress alone. States may aid in its
pursuit, under federal guidance, but may not select their own means to
protect the nation's borders.
IV. Alienage Laws as Indirect Regulation of Immigration
and Foreign Policy
State laws may affect immigration and foreign policy even though
the purpose and object of regulation is entirely local. Protection of
local resources, health and welfare, and economic interests, although
traditionally within a state's police power, may be contained in paro-
chial legislation that cause significant, albeit indirect, external effects.
This is a common occurrence with state economic regulation-one
that is often scrutinized under the dormant Commerce Clause. When
local legislation has transcendent effects implicating the nation's for-
eign relations or immigration policy, that, too, requires careful exami-
nation 40 This is particularly true of laws imposing unique burdens or
civil disabilities on aliens. "Laws imposing such burdens,... even
though they may be immediately associated with the accomplishment
of a local purpose .... provoke questions in the field of international
affairs. 5 341
Nonetheless, not all state laws with "foreign resonances" are in-
valid. A law which merely has "some incidental or indirect effect in
foreign countries"'342 and whose effect on foreign relations "is slight in
337. Accord, Plyler, 457 U.S. at 228 ("a State might have an interest in mitigating the
potentially harsh economic effects of sudden shifts in population" caused by "an influx of
illegal immigrants").
338. Id. at 219 ("if the Federal Government has by uniform rule prescribed what it
believes to be appropriate standards for the treatment of an alien subclass, the States may,
of course, follow the federal direction.") (citing De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976)).
339. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 226 (1982).
340. See Recommended Analysis, supra note 144, at 837 ("decisions in cases involving
possible state intrusion into foreign affairs must continue to strike an appropriate balance
between preservation of the values of local self-government and the need for national uni-
formity in matters of international affairs").
341. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66 (1941).
342. Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 517 (1947); De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
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relation to the domestic purpose served"a 3 is valid unless preempted
by positive law. Still, courts should be mindful of even indirect effects
because foreign governments may not appreciate the subtle doctrinal
distinctions involved when their nationals are adversely affected by
state laws.a "Experience has shown that international controversies
of the gravest moment, sometimes even leading to war, may arise
from real or imagined wrongs to another's subjects inflicted, or per-
mitted, by a government."345
This strand of the dormant immigration clause requires an assess-
ment of the state and federal interests affected and a balancing of the
two.3 46 Where the purpose and effect of a state law is to reach a mat-
ter within its police power, and it does not seriously implicate the na-
tion's need to speak with a single voice,347 the state law should be
upheld. In contrast, if any adverse effects from the state law might fall
on the nation as a whole,3 48 the need for national uniformity is great.
States should not have the opportunity to control national policy in
this manner.
Equally important is that states not indirectly regulate immigra-
tion under the guise of internal regulation. If a state is unable to artic-
ulate and defend some legitimate state interest as the object of its
laws, then even an incidental effect on immigration policy will be too
great. As with the dormant Commerce Clause, illusory or poorly
served state objectives may disguise an intent to usurp federal super-
intendence of immigration policy. Thus, in evaluating state regulation
of aliens, it becomes necessary to identify the state's interests, whether
the means employed are likely to actually promote them, and their
probable impact on federal interests. This inquiry is usually not as
rigorous as that employed under the Court's equal protection
343. Federalism and Foreign Relations, supra note 13, at 300.
344. Cf. Comments by Senator Coffee regarding state registration laws, 84 CONG. REC.
9536 ("Are we not guilty of deliberately insulting nations with whom we maintain friendly
diplomatic relations? Are we not humiliating their nationals? Are we not violating the
traditions and experiences of a century and a half?") (cited in Hines, 312 U.S. at 64 n.12).
345. Hines, 312 U.S. at 64.
346. "[I]t would seem that with respect to foreign affairs the Constitution at least says
to the states: You may incidentally affect foreign relations in effectuating a domestic inter-
est so long as the adverse effect of your action on foreign relations is not very serious in
relation to the strength of your domestic interest, but you may not under any circum-
stances take independent action designed to affect foreign relations." Federalism and For-
eign Relations, supra note 12, at 307.
347. Cf. Japan Line Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 449 (1979) (state law
offends the Commerce Clause if it frustrates the federal government's ability to "speak
with one voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign governments").
348. Cf. Recommended Analysis, supra note 144, at 838-39.
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model,349 but it does'have teeth. "[S]tate laws should at least be scru-
tinized with care in order to insure that our national interest is not
being needlessly jeopardized. '350
A. Identifying and Evaluating Legitimate State Interests
States frequently deny aliens rights and benefits available to citi-
zens. When they do so pursuant to federal directives, as under some
medical and welfare assistance programs,35' the denials are hard to
assail on supremacy grounds. However, states may elect to go beyond
the restrictions in federal law, or may impose burdens on state pro-
grams or on aliens' economic opportunity. Here they must assert a
valid independent state interest. Ultimately, it is these articulated in-
terests that must prove the local nature of the regulation and justify
any impact it may have on the federal immigration power.
However, mere recitation of a valid state interest is inade-
quate.3 52 When a state law touches foreign affairs, there will be a
careful inquiry as to whether the articulated purpose or some forbid-
den objective in fact lies behind the law.353 For instance, both a state's
economic interests and concern for physical safety were rejected as
illusory in Tayyari v. New Mexico State University.354 In that case, the
state attempted to bar Iranian students from state universities after
Iranian radicals seized American hostages in Tehran. The district
court found that the state's "true purpose in enacting the [exclusion
349. See Examining Bd. of Engrs., Architects, & Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S.
572, 605 (1976) ("the governmental interest claimed to justify the discrimination is to be
carefully examined in order to determine whether that interest is legitimate and substan-
tial, and inquiry must be made whether the means adopted to achieve the goal are neces-
sary and precisely drawn"). The equal protection analysis is limited to discrimination
against resident aliens in non-political function positions. See infra Section V.
350. Federalism and Foreign Relations, supra note 13, at 251.
351. Indigent aliens unlawfully present in the United States are entitled to restricted
Medicaid coverage for emergency medical conditions. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(33) (1995).
Other state aid to undocumented aliens is not reimbursed by the federal government. See
generally 42 U.S.C. § 1396(b) (1995) [Medicaid], 42 C.F.R. §§ 435.406, 435.408 (1990); and
42 U.S.C. § 202 (1994) [AFDC], 45 C.F.R. § 233.50-233.52 (1988).
352. See Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 42 (1915) ("it will not be disputed that [the legiti-
mate interests of the state] cannot be so broadly conceived as to bring them into hostility to
exclusive Federal power").
353. Springfield Rare Coin Galleries, Inc. v. Johnson, 503 N.E.2d 300 (Ill. 1986). The
Illinois Legislature had created an exemption from state occupation and use taxes for coins
and currency issued by the United States and any foreign country except South Africa.
The Supreme Court of Illinois held that the exclusion of South African coins was not "mo-
tivated by a legitimate, permissible State purpose... the exclusion's sole motivation [was]
disapproval of a nation's policies" and this "create[d] a risk of conflict between nations,
and possible retaliatory measures." Id. at 307.
354. 495 F. Supp. 1365 (D.N.M. 1980).
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law] was to make a political statement.., to 'do something' about the
Iranian students on campus." '355 Although the state's response to the
Iranian hostage crisis was "understandable," its politically-motivated
action "entered the arenas of foreign affairs and immigration policy,
interrelated matters entrusted exclusively to the federal
government. 356
As evident from Tayyari, courts in state alienage cases may be
hesitant to accept proffered state interests at face value. Because the
purpose behind a state law can determine whether it is a regulation of
immigration or of local affairs, that purpose requires close examina-
tion. Even legitimate purposes become suspect if they are poorly
served by a state's alienage law. For instance, the lower courts in Ply-
ler rejected Texas' claim that excluding undocumented children from
public education improved the educational environment for lawful
residents. The state was unable to establish the necessary link. 5
A similar problem arises where a state bases a denial of benefits
to aliens on the ground that ineligibility discourages illegal immigra-
tion. First, that object is not within the states' police power. Second,
most social science and economic analyses agree that social benefits
have very little impact on an alien's decision to enter the United
States, whether lawfully or unlawfully. Nor do they enter the country
to seek education for their children.358 The biggest draws are employ-
ment opportunities and wages better than those in their native
countries .3
59
States can be clever and convincing in supplying legitimate state
interests. A California law prohibiting employment of undocumented
aliens passed muster partly because the ban depended on ad hoe
showings of adverse impact on the domestic labor force. 360 Without
355. Id. at 1376.
356. Id.
357. In re Alien Children Educ. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 544, 574 (S.D. Tex. 1980), affd sub
nom. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
358. "Virtually all of the undocumented persons who come into this country seek em-
ployment opportunities and not educational benefits." In re Alien Children Education
Litigation, 501 F. Supp. at 578. See also Plyler, 457 U.S. at 228.
359. "Undocumented persons do not come to Texas with a vision of America as an
endemic welfare state; they come here to work." In re Alien Children Educ. Litig., 501 F.
Supp. at 578. See also United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 915 (1975) (White, J., concur-
ring) (traditional responses to illegal immigration "at best can demonstrate only minimal
effectiveness as long as it is lawful for business firms and others to employ aliens who are
illegally in the country").
360. In De Canas, the Court held that the employer sanctions involved "appear[ ] to be
designed to protect the opportunities of lawfully admitted aliens for obtaining and holding
jobs, rather than to add to their burdens." But, "[t]he question whether § 2805(a) never-
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such a contingency, the ban might have been viewed as an attempt to
deter illegal immigration, obstructing both federal immigration and la-
bor policies.36' Conversely, state laws can be patently aimed at imper-
missible objectives, perhaps as the result of overzealous drafting. For
instance, California's Proposition 187 prohibits all health care facilities
receiving public funds from providing non-emergency medical services
to undocumented aliens.361 Since virtually all facilities, including pri-
vate providers, receive some public funds, the prohibition is a com-
plete one. While the denial of state-paid care might be supported as
preserving public resources, the ban on private, patient-paid, insured,
and eleemosynary care cannot be. Thus, the restriction reveals an ul-
terior and forbidden purpose-to drive aliens out of the state. Even if
limited to publicly-funded care, the ban would be irrational. Since the
initiative denies preventive and early intervention medical services,
but permits emergency care (as required by federal law), it ultimately
increases the state's costs, again belying a purpose to preserve public
funds.363 The initiative thus "go[es] beyond the stated intent of its
proponents. ' '364
States surely have strong and legitimate interests in protecting the
health, safety, and general welfare of their residents and businesses.
Where immigrants are seen as threatening these concerns, they are
the proper subject of state regulation. But because these interests are
so pervasive and underlie a vast range of state legislation, their mere
invocation can overwhelm a principled effort to protect federal
supremacy over immigration. Accordingly, courts must be cautious in
reviewing any purported nexus between state welfare and alienage
legislation.
theless in fact imposes burdens bringing it into conflict with the INA is open for inquiry on
remand." De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 358 (1976).
361. The Court engaged such an inquiry in De Canas, upholding the law because it
"focuses directly upon these essentially local problems and is tailored to combat effectively
the perceived evils." 424 U.S. at 357. It did so again in Plyler, this time finding that none
of the asserted state interests was furthered by the statute. 457 U.S. 202, 228-29 (1982).
362. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 130 (Deering Supp. 1995) [Proposition 187, Sec-
tion 6].
363. See REBECCA LAVALLY, CALIFORNIA SENATE OFFICE OF RESEARCH, ADDRESS-
ING IMMIGRATION ISSUES IN CALIFORNIA (March 1994) [hereinafter SENATE OFFICE OF
RESEARCH]. This analysis suggests that potential savings could be offset by the loss of
federal funds. Id. at 11. Moreover, most economic analyses of the effects of illegal immi-
gration tend to show that it adds to, not drains, the domestic economy. See Immigration
Policy, supra note 26, at 1441-42, and nn.45-48.
364. See CALIFORNIA SENATE OFFICE OF RESEARCH, supra note 363, at 2.
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B. Alienage Legislation
1. Restricting Property Acquisition
One of the earliest forms of civil disability imposed by states on
non-citizens were "alien land laws." Some of these laws were cleverly
disguised to be neutral, such as the California Alien Land Law65
which applied only to aliens ineligible to become U.S. citizens (coinci-
dentally, Japanese). Others were explicit in their prohibition of land
ownership by particular nationalities, typically British, Chinese, and
Japanese. 366 These early laws were upheld by the Supreme Court
against equal protection and due process attack,367 but later variants
were declared unconstitutional.3 68
A similar form of property discrimination is found in state inheri-
tance laws. These would often permit non-resident aliens to acquire
personal property through probate only if certain conditions were
met. One, known as the reciprocity rule, was that a nonresident alien
could inherit property only if, under the laws of the alien's nation,
American citizens had a "reciprocal right" to inherit personal prop-
erty on the same terms and conditions as the alien's fellow citizens.3 69
Another, and more controversial, condition was that the legatee's
home country must grant her the right to retain the inherited prop-
erty.370 This latter condition was designed to prevent Nazi and com-
munist countries from confiscating devised property.371 If the foreign
beneficiary could not prove satisfaction of the applicable condition,
the property would go to eligible legatees, if any, or escheat to the
state.
The proliferation of state inheritance rules affecting aliens re-
sulted in two somewhat conflicting Supreme Court decisions. In Clark
v. Allen, the Court upheld California's reciprocity statute.372 The
Court noted that succession was usually a matter of state concern, and
that the law conflicted with neither a treaty nor federal policy.3 73 Be-
365. 1921 Cal. Stat. lxxxiii.
366. Over a dozen states had such laws. See Iron Curtain Statutes, supra note 67, at 645-
46.
367. See Frick v. Webb, 263 U.S. 326 (1923); Webb v. O'Brien, 263 U.S. 313 (1923);
Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U.S. 225 (1923); Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923).
368. See Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948); Sei Fujii v. California, 242 P.2d 617
(Cal. 1952).
369. See Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 516 (1947).
370. See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
371. See Iron Curtain Statutes, supra note 67, at 646.
372. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 259 (1942), cited in Clark, 331 U.S. at 506.
373. 331 U.S. at 516.
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cause there was little discernible impact on foreign affairs, no overrid-
ing federal interest was impeded.
However, in Zschernig v. Miller, the Supreme Court struck down
Oregon's "Iron Curtain Statute,"374 which permitted the descent of
local property to foreign nationals only if their countries guaranteed
the "benefit, use or control of [it] without confiscation. ' 375 As Justice
Douglas noted, influencing the "cold war" was the "real desiderata"
of the law.376 In essence, the condition required state judges to con-
duct their own foreign policy review and to assess other regimes by
American standards. The Court explained the difference between
that case and Clark as one of degree, both in terms of the respective
state interests and their impact on foreign affairs. The California law
in Clark involved a somewhat perfunctory determination of inheri-
tance laws of other nations. In this regard, it was not materially differ-
ent from other inquiries into foreign law, such as occur in choice of
law problems.3 77 The Oregon law in Zschernig, however, required
multifarious and "minute inquiries concerning the actual administra-
tion of foreign law, [and] into the credibility of foreign diplomatic
statements. '378 The Court held that, because of "its great potential
for disruption or embarrassment," the Oregon law had "more than
'some incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries.' ' 3 7 9 In the
Court's view, the Oregon statute, "affect[ed] international relations in
a persistent and subtle way."380
In addition to their differential impact on foreign relations, the
laws in Clark and Zschernig differed in the local interests served. Rec-
iprocity statutes, as in Clark, may promote inheritance rights for state
residents. In contrast, it is hard to see how the confiscation statute in
Zschernig could inure to the benefit of state residents; its only purpose
seems to have been to criticize foreign governments.381 The law, even
though couched as a police power regulation of local property, lacked
374. 389 U.S. 429 (1968); see Iron Curtain Statutes, supra note 67.
375. Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 430 n.1. Oregon was not alone in enacting such laws. See,
e.g., In re Estate of Kish, 246 A.2d 1 (NJ. 1968).
376. Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 437.
377. 389 U.S. at 433 n.5; id. at 461-62 (Harlan, J., concurring).
378. Id. at 435.
379. Id. at 434-35.
380. Id. at 440. "Iron Curtain" statutes in other states have also been invalidated on
this basis. See, e.g., Goldstein v. Cox, 391 F.2d 586 (2d Cir. 1968). See also New York
Times Co. v. City of New York Comm'n on Human Rights, 361 N.E.2d 963 (N.Y. 1977),
invalidating prohibition on advertising employment opportunities in South Africa.
381. Cf. Springfield Rare Coin Galleries, Inc. v. Johnson, 503 N.E.2d 300, 305 (Ill. 1986)
(invalidating exception for South African Krugerands to sales tax exemption because the
exclusion was not "motivated by a legitimate, permissible State purpose").
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a legitimate local interest and had too great an effect on federal
interests.
2. Prohibiting Employment
Restrictions on employment of aliens have an indirect but
profound effect on immigration. Most courts and commentators agree
that employment is the principal magnet for both legal and illegal im-
migration.8 2 Thus, state laws that restrict employment opportunities
for aliens can discourage entry or deprive it of its purpose. However,
states are not without a legitimate concern here. In an economy such
as ours that treats labor as a commodity, an influx of foreign workers
tends to depress wages. The problem is more acute when the workers
are "undocumented," since their numbers are not well controlled and
they are easily victimized by employers. Accordingly, the domestic
workforce is often on the front line against illegal immigration.383
When a state prohibits the employment of lawfully admitted
aliens, it frustrates Congress' purpose in granting them entry.384 State
laws that only partially restrict employment, such as by excluding resi-
dent aliens from selected professions or government positions, may
have less of an impact on immigration, but nonetheless undermine
federal policies. For that reason, laws regulating employment of resi-
dent aliens are generally suspect and seldom survive. While these
382. See In re Alien Children Educ. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 544, 578-79 (S.D. Tex. 1980)
(noting that overwhelming evidence indicates unimportance of social services such as pub-
lic education in decision to immigrate), aff'd mem., (5th Cir. Feb. 23, 1981) (No. 80-1934),
aff'd and discussed, Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). See also Immigration Policy, supra
note 28, at 1438; R. Blum, Labor Standards Enforcement and the Results of Labor Migra-
tion: Protecting Undocumented Workers After Sure-Tan, the IRCA, and Patel, 63 N.Y.U. L.
Rtv. 1342 (1988); Public Benefits, supra note 292, at 221 ("Unauthorized aliens often
forego both necessary medical care and other public assistance because they fear INS de-
tection or falling into heavy debt to cover expenses"); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422
U.S. 873, 878-79 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 228 (1982);
Commission for the Study of International Migration and Cooperative Economic Develop-
ment, Unauthorized Migration: An Economic Development Response 13, 107 (1990); Eco-
nomic Report of the President 233 (1986); Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee
Policy, U.S. Immigration Policy and the National Interes; Final Report 36 (1981).
383. It is interesting to note that cases such as De Canas are often prosecuted by resi-
dent migrant workers. See also Dias v. Kay-Dix Ranch, 88 Cal. Rptr. 443, 444 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1970); Demise of Implied Preemption, supra note 168, at 296 n.7 (describing opposi-
tion to "illegal workers" by Cesar Chavez of the United Farmworkers Union).
384. See Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 42 (1915) ("[t]he assertion of an authority to deny
to aliens the opportunity of earning a livelihood when lawfully admitted to the State would
be tantamount to an assertion of the right to deny them entrance and abode, for in ordi-
nary cases they cannot live where they cannot work.").
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laws are often reviewed under equal protection, preemption provides
an alternative and perhaps superior analytical approach. 385
State restrictions on the employment of undocumented aliens
presents a different issue. These restrictions are arguably coincident
with federal immigration policy. Thus, state laws regulating employ-
ment of aliens without federal work authorization ordinarily survive
conflict preemption.386 However, supremacy theory (at least that
which is explored here) goes beyond ordinary preemption. Since the
nexus between employment and entry is so strong, state laws in this
area are properly examined as indirect regulations of immigration.
Moreover, it is not merely federal immigration policy that is affected
by state employment laws; federal labor policies and general eco-
nomic interests must also be considered.
States usually advance two interests for restricting the private em-
ployment of aliens: to preserve employment opportunities for the
state's own citizens; and to discourage illegal immigration. The for-
mer has been found to be a legitimate state interest; the latter's valid-
ity is less clear.3 7 The presence of undocumented workers is said by
some to adversely affect emplo'ment opportunities for the domestic
labor force, suppressing wages and increasing unemployment. 388 It is
a legitimate exercise of a state's police power to improve employment
and general economic conditions. Moreover, that objective is argua-
bly consistent with federal immigration policy. A second labor-related
problem, associated with illegal immigration in particular, is the vic-
timization of employees. Undocumented workers are less likely to
complain about workplace safety and labor violations due to their fear
of deportation. As a result, unscrupulous employers not only exploit
those fears, but often prefer undocumented workers over citizens and
aliens with work permits for that very reason.389
385. See infra Section V.
386. See De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356-60 (1976).
387. See supra Section III D.
388. "[A]cceptance by illegal aliens of jobs on substandard terms as to wages and work-
ing conditions can seriously depress wage scales and working conditions of citizens and
legally admitted aliens; and employment of illegal aliens under such conditions can dimin-
ish the effectiveness of labor unions." De Canas, 424 U.S. at 356-57. See also United States
v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878-79 (1975); Larez v. Oberti, 100 Cal. Rptr. 57, 58 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1972) ("It is stated that at least 20 percent of the work force in the [California
counties] consists of such workers, which has resulted in the depression of domestic farm
workers' wages and working conditions, the creation of excessive unemployment among
farm workers and farm workers being unnecessarily dependent upon welfare.").
389. See Demise of Implied Preemption, supra note 168, at 298.
Summer 19951
996 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 22:939
States' traditional regulatory concern over business and employ-
ment practices easily evolves into a concern over employment of un-
documented workers. Thus, controlling the influx of undocumented
aliens is a legitimate state interest if geared to employment issues.
However, it is often used as a pretext for less benign attempts to con-
trol immigration.
In De Canas v. Bica, the Supreme Court found a California law
prohibiting the employment of undocumented aliens promoted the
strong and traditional state objective of "protect[ing] workers within
the State.'390 Because the state law adopted federal standards in im-
posing employer sanctions, the Court found it did not conflict either
with the operation or purpose of federal law.391 Indeed, there is some
suggestion that state action was not only harmonious with, but also
authorized by, federal law.392 The case for a delegation of power to
the states may have been weak, but coupled with tacit congressional
approval it sufficed to avoid problems under the dormant immigration
clause.393 Indeed, later cases confirm that this congressional approval
was critical to upholding the California law.394
390. 424 U.S. at 356.
391. "Both arguments put forth by the Court in De Canas are suspect. California's
statute did in fact regulate immigration, because it could not have achieved its purpose of
preserving employment opportunities for citizens without adding a more effective enforce-
ment mechanism to the federal immigration law. Furthermore, courts generally do not and
should not find in a single narrow statute the congressional intent to renounce exclusive
authority over such a thoroughly 'national issue."' Immigration Policy, supra note 28, at
1448-49.
392. The Court stated: "there is evidence in the form of the 1974 amendments to the
Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act, 88 Stat. 1652, 7 U.S.C. § 2041 (1970 ed., Supp.
IV), that Congress intends that States may, to the extent consistent with federal law, regu-
late the employment of illegal aliens." De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 361 (1976). Addi-
tional evidence might be gleaned from 1965 amendments to INA. See Preemption and the
Illegal Alien, supra note 143, at 173. The Court may also have felt that federal authorities
were not effectively enforcing employer sanctions in U.S. immigration laws. See Immigra-
tion Policy, supra note 28, at 1441.
393. In Barclays Bank v. Franchise Tax Bd., 114 S. Ct. 2268, 2282-83 (1994), referring
to state burdens on foreign commerce, the Court stated that while "Congress may more
passively indicate that certain state practices do not 'impair federal uniformity in an area
where federal uniformity is essential,' it need not convey its intent with the unmistakable
clarity required to permit state regulation that discriminates against interstate commerce."
(citing Japan Line Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 448 (1979)). Indeed, in
Barclays, the Court drew inferences of congressional approval, or at least tolerance, of
state actions bearing on foreign relations from its failure to preempt state laws despite
considering several bills to that effect. 114 S. Ct. at 2283-84.
394. Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 13 n.18 (1982) (stating that preemption claim was re-
jected in De Canas "not because of an absence of congressional intent to preempt, but
because Congress [intended] that the States be allowed, 'to the extent consistent with fed-
eral law, [to] regulate the employment of illegal aliens') (quoting De Canas, 424 U.S. at
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While the specific holding of De Canas has been superseded by
later-enacted preemptive federal legislation," the Court's approach
remains: a state may prohibit employment of undocumented aliens if
its purpose is to improve economic conditions rather than to obstruct
immigration or intrude on federal policies.3 96 This result seems a rea-
sonable accommodation of competing state and federal interests. But
a closer examination of the California law in De Canas reveals that its
purpose may in fact have been to usurp federal prerogatives and dis-
place federal choices.
A few years prior to De Canas, the California Court of Appeal
ruled that resident workers had no cause of action against employers
who hired undocumented aliens in violation of federal law.397 The
court stated that "expropriation of the farm job market by illegal en-
trants represents an abject failure of national [immigration] policy. '398
The court went on to describe the "self-imposed impotence of our na-
tional government" and the "two prime areas of federal misfeasance":
inadequate border patrols and tacit encouragement of illegal employ-
ment.399 It then counseled Congress on how best to stem the tide of
illegal immigration by providing a mini-treatise on its causes and ef-
fects. Nonetheless, an injunction against employment of undocu-
mented workers was denied because "[i]t is more orderly, more
effectual, less burdensome to the affected interests, that the national
government redeem its commitment" to controlling immigration.4 ° °
Also, despite ostensibly leaving the question open, the court seemed
concerned that an "injunction would invade the sphere of immigration
regulation exclusively reserved to the federal government. '40 1
The state legislature responded to Diaz with the law ultimately
considered in De Canas.4 °2 Regulations adopted under the statute re-
quired employers to ascertain the citizenship and immigration status
361). See also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 241 n.6 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring) ("In De
Canas ... [t]he Court found evidence that Congress intended state regulation in this
area").
395. See infra note 418.
396. De Canas, 424 U.S. at 363. "[T]o the extent [prior cases finding state laws pre-
cluded] were based on the predominance of federal interest in the fields of immigration
and foreign affairs, there would not appear to be a similar federal interest in a situation in
which the state law is fashioned to remedy local problems... "
397. Diaz v. Kay-Dix Ranch, 88 Cal. Rptr. 443, 451 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970).
398. Id. at 449.
399. Id.
400. Id. at 451.
401. Id.
402. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2083 (Deering 1991).
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of all job applicants.4 °3 By necessity, employers would need to be fa-
miliar with federal immigration documents, federal labor conditions,
and carry the burden of ferreting out undocumented workers. 0 4 State
cases construing the statute and implementing regulations found them
to be a regulation of immigration and, as such, preempted and uncon-
stitutional.40 5 They reasoned that Congress had fully occupied the
field; even if it had not, the state law interfered with Congress' exclu-
sive power.40 6 In reversing these state decisions, the Supreme Court
found the state's objective to be legitimate (promoting employment)
rather than forbidden (immigration control). This disagreement be-
tween California courts, which ordinarily are in a superior position to
discover the purpose of state law, and the Supreme Court again indi-
cates the elusive distinction between direct and indirect state immigra-
tion laws.
The state courts had the better of the argument. "California's
statute did in fact regulate immigration, because it could not have
achieved its purpose of preserving employment opportunities for citi-
zens without adding a more effective enforcement mechanism to the
federal immigration law."'40 7 Surely Congress may enlist state assist-
ance in the enforcement of immigration policy. But in the absence of
affirmative expressions to this effect, state self-help may complicate
403. CAL. ADMIN. CODE, tit. 8, pt. 1, ch. 8, art. 1, Obligation of Employer, §§ 16209-
16209.6 (Cal. Admin. Reg. 72, No. 23-A) (1972).
404. See CAL. ADMIN. CODE, §§ 16209 (employer must check each applicant for INS
Form 1-151 "or any other document issued by the United States Immigration and Naturali-
zation Service which authorizes him to work"); 16209.3 ("An employer who knowingly
employs an alien not entitled to lawful residence shall not be exonerated from prosecution
for violation of Labor Code Section 2805 notwithstanding his having obtained a signed
declaration of citizenship from the alien"); 16209.6 ("Employment [proscribed] in any cate-
gory of employment not enumerated on Schedule A in Labor Department Regulations 29
C.F.R. § 60.7") (Cal. Admin. Reg. 72, No. 23-A) (1972).
405. Dolores Canning v. Howard, 115 Cal. Rptr. 435, 444 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974) (based
on both preemption and dormant immigration power grounds); De Canas v. Bica, 115 Cal.
Rptr. 444, 446 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974), rev'd sub nom. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
Another decision of the California Court of Appeal, Larez v. Oberti, 100 Cal. Rptr. 57,59-
60 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972), found that the statute did not provide grounds for injunctive relief
against employers of undocumented workers. See also Purdy & Fitzpatrick v. State of Cali-
fornia, 456 P.2d 645, 651 (Cal. 1969) (declaring a predecessor statute violative of federal
supremacy); Nozewski Polish Style Meat Prods. v. Meskill, 376 F. Supp. 610, 611 (D. Conn.
1974).
406. "The fact that Congress has intentionally refused to act in an area of exclusive
federal cognizance does not constitutionally authorize the states to do so." Dolores Can-
ning, 115 Cal. Rptr. 435 at 441-42.
407. Immigration Policy, supra note 28, at 1448.
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national efforts. °8 It ought not be left to each state to determine how
best to effectuate federal policies. This is especially true since federal
policies are sometimes ambiguous, as when Congress elects to permit
employment of undocumented workers, extends labor law protection
to them,40 9 and provides them with free medical care,410 despite ef-
forts to prohibit their entry. As a result, state laws, even if viewed as
only incidental regulation of immigration, can have a profound impact
on federal immigration and labor policy. California's disagreement
with that policy gives it no license to challenge it or force the federal
government's hand, which is ultimately what happened.411
The flip side of De Canas is that states may not only permit em-
ployment of undocumented aliens without intruding on federal pre-
rogatives, but can order them employed. In Arizona Farmworkers
Union v. Phoenix Vegetable Distributors,41 2 a state court ordered rein-
statement of six undocumented workers who had been discharged in
violation of Arizona labor law. The court held that the reinstatement
order was preempted neither by federal labor law nor by the INA.413
The court further held that ordering an employer to reinstate persons
working in violation of federal law did not obstruct federal immigra-
408. "In fact, several courts have recognized in recent years that the denial of rights to
undocumented aliens sometimes has the ironic result of subverting the INA's related aims
of deterring illegal immigration and protecting the nation's low-skilled laborers, because
aliens who have no right to attack unfair labor practices may constitute an attractive
workforce for unscrupulous employers." Immigration Policy, supra note 28, at 1453 n.106.
409. Sure-Tan v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883 (1984); NLRB v. International Longshoremen's
Ass'n Local 1581, 489 F.2d 635, 637-38 (5th Cir. 1974) (job preferences based on citizenship
constituted an unfair labor practice).
410. States are required to pay for care and services received by an alien who is not
lawfully admitted for permanent residence or otherwise permanently residing in the U.S.
under color of law and who is otherwise eligible for Medicaid under the state's plan, if the
care and services are necessary for the treatment of an emergency medical condition. His-
torically, federal matching payments to the states for these emergency services have been
made at each state's regular matching rate. Federal matching was raised to 100% of ex-
penditures in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, P.L. 103-66 (1993).
411. On May 3, 1973, the House of Representatives passed H.R. No. 982, amending 8
U.S.C. § 1324(a) to provide a penalty for knowingly employing any alien not lawfully ad-
mitted to the United States for permanent residence. (H.R. No. 982, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.,
pp. 3-5 (1973)).
412. 747 P.2d 574, 578 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986).
413. "Under the INA, employers are not prohibited from employing undocumented
aliens, even those subject to a final order of deportation or awaiting voluntary departure.
Thus, an employer can reinstate an illegal alien worker without violating the INA." Id. at
577.
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tion policy.4 14 This result is dubious, even in light of De Canas, since
employment of aliens is functionally related to immigration.
The major shift in policy toward employment of undocumented
workers, evidenced in De Canas and in state legislation,415 resulted in
the enactment of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986
(IRCA).416 For the first time federal law imposed criminal sanctions
on employers for knowingly hiring undocumented workers.417 IRCA
now preempts state laws with a similar purpose.4 18 But it should not
have taken positive law to reach this result. Immigration and labor
relations are among Congress' most expansive powers. State usurpa-
tion or interference negates that supremacy.
For instance, in the area of labor policy, the preemptive force of
federal law is so strong that states are displaced not only by legislation
and administrative regulations, but also by federal common law cre-
ated by the Supreme Court.4 1 9 That common law is itself so strong
that it provides private rights of action for damages against states who
improperly enter the preempted realm.420 Supreme Court decisions
regarding immigration policy are also common law. It cannot be said
that the Court has less power to enforce paramount federal concerns
414. Quoting De Canas, the court held "an order of reinstatement would have no more
than 'some purely speculative and indirect impact upon immigration."' 747 P.2d at 578.
"We hold, therefore, that a state order of reinstatement does not in fact stand as an obsta-
cle to the accomplishment of INA's goal of deterring illegal immigration." Id.
415. Several states responded to De Canas with laws similar to California's, prohibiting
employment of undocumented aliens. See generally SASHA G. LEWIS, SLAVE TRADE To-
DAY 168-69 (1979). As in De Canas, these laws were commonly upheld. See, e.g., Garcia v.
Department of Labor, 521 So.2d 608 (La. 1988) (Louisiana law prohibiting employment of
undocumented workers not preempted by INA).
416. Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986). IRCA also provided for the legalization
of aliens under an "amnesty" program. See generally James Marx, Legalization Under the
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986: Scope of Confidentiality Provisions and
Problems in Proving Residence, 41 U. MIAMI L. Rnv. 1077 (1987). Other recent federal
enactments include the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986 (P.L. 99-639)
and the Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1986 (P.L. 99-653).
417. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1) (1994) ("It is unlawful for a person or other entity to
hire, or to recruit or refer for a fee, for employment in the United States an alien knowing
the alien is an unauthorized alien.., with respect to such employment") (added by P.L. 99-
603, 100 Stat. 3359).
418. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (1994) ("The provisions of this section preempt any
State or local law imposing civil or criminal sanctions (other than through licensing and
similar laws) upon those who employ, or recruit or refer for a fee for employment, unau-
thorized aliens").
419. See, e.g., Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 475 U.S. 608 (1986);
Machinists Union v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958).
420. See, e.g., Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 108-15
(1989) (Golden State II).
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here than with labor law,42' and it has done so in other areas of for-
eign affairs (for example, the act of state doctrine422). There is even a
stronger reason to do so here. Considerations of separation of powers
augment federalism concerns. Foreign policy and immigration issues
are peculiarly the province of the political branches.423 The Supreme
Court often defers to them in immigration matters, even when funda-
mental constitutional rights are asserted.424
The Court's reluctance to do so, when it comes to undocumented
aliens, might reflect a concern for states' rights or simply agreement
with underlying state law. Or perhaps, unlike other forms of state im-
migration law, employment restrictions are seen as compatible with
federal policy.425 Nonetheless, state limitations on the employment of
aliens, both documented and undocumented, can severely burden fed-
eral policies. For that reason, in the absence of explicit preemption,
they need to be carefully scrutinized under the dormant immigration
clause. Restrictions can also exacerbate internal tensions in neighbor-
ing countries which may thereby complicate American foreign pol-
icy.426 Accordingly, our neighbors may view such laws as "the product
421. The Supreme Court has derived its authority to create an entire body of labor law
from a jurisdictional statute, Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act
("Taft-Hartley Act"), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1988). See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957).
422. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 421-27 (1964) (finding act of
state doctrine was a doctrine of federal common law binding upon the states). While Sab-
batino was premised on separation of powers principles, rather than federalism, it is an
example of the Court deriving authority to create binding law from the structure of the
Constitution relating to foreign affairs. See Recommended Analysis, supra note 144, at 836
(the importance of Sabbatino "is the Court's clear recognition that the federal common law
powers of the judiciary may rely upon the logic of the constitutional structure to resolve
matters of national-state conflict in foreign affairs").
423. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976) (finding "the responsibility for regulating
the relationship between the United States and our alien visitors has been committed to
the political branches of the Federal Government. Since decisions in these matters may
implicate our relations with foreign powers, and since a wide variety of classifications must
be defined in the light of changing political and economic circumstances, such decisions are
frequently of a character more appropriate to either the Legislature or the Executive than
to the Judiciary").
424. See, e.g., Mathews, 426 U.S. at 81-82 ("The reasons that preclude judicial review of
political questions also dictate a narrow standard of review of decisions made by the Con-
gress or the President in the area of immigration and naturalization."); The Chinese Exclu-
sion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889); KIeindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972) (upholding
denial of visa based on government disagreement with alien's political views).
425. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 225 (1982).
426. See Immigration Policy, supra note 28, at 1459 n.132 ("The complex political and
economic ties that now exist between the United States and Mexico require that Mexico's
interests in maintaining employment opportunities for its citizens be accommodated as
well. Should Mexico's current economic crisis further destabilize that nation politically, the
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of selfish provincialism, rather than an instrument of justifiable pol-
icy.' 427 Employment of undocumented workers is as much an eco-
nomic issue as a legal or political one.4' Undocumented workers are
encouraged during boom times and the first to feel the pinch during
recession.429 Even when the law plainly prohibits their employment,
enforcement is often lax because of powerful forces within the econ-
omy which benefit from their presence in the labor market "as a
source of cheap labor."430 In other words, lax enforcement of immi-
gration laws may be a conscious decision by the federal government,
rather than the result of neglect or incompetence.
3. Exclusion of Aliens from Civil Institutions
Exclusion of aliens from the community, either literally or eco-
nomically, can be more than simply a manifestation of xenophobia or
nativism. Defining the polity itself requires some distinction between
members ("citizens") and strangers. 431 According to some political
theorists, "exclusion at the border is necessary for membership or
political citizenship to flourish under liberal democracy. This is due to
existential or psychological factors-establishing a 'we' in contrast to
United States might lose the longstanding security of having a reliable political ally on its
border, as well as access to that nation's oil market") (citations omitted).
427. Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Board of Comm'rs, 80 Cal. Rptr. 800,805 (Cal. Ct. App.
1969).
428. "[H]istory shows that funding for rigid enforcement will last only as long as does
the nation's concern with high unemployment; indeed, the ineffectiveness of the immigra-
tion barriers instituted by Congress is itself largely a function of economic conditions."
Immigration Policy, supra note 28, at 1440. See also id. at 1442-43.
429. See Immigration Policy, supra note 28, at 1440 n.36 ("Public pressure for enforce-
ment has been cyclical since the original institution of immigration restrictions. It has
peaked in economic hard times and isolationist periods, and waned during times of eco-
nomic growth and labor shortages").
430. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,219 (1982). See also Immigration Policy, supra note 28,
at 1440 n.37 ("Labor market considerations have played a critical role in shaping the immi-
gration law since its inception. Indeed, Congress has often treated immigration legislation
as an element of labor policy"). Undocumented workers are considered "employees"
under the National Labor Relations Act. See Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 892
(1984) ("Since undocumented aliens are not among the few groups of workers expressly
exempted by Congress, they plainly come within the broad statutory definition of
'employee"').
431. "The distinction between citizens and aliens, though ordinarily irrelevant to pri-
vate activity, is fundamental to the definition and government of a State." Ambach v.
Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 75 (1979). See also Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 296 (1978)
(noting the state's duty "to preserve the basic conception of a political community") (quot-
ing Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973)); Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 648 (recogniz-
ing a "State's historical power to exclude aliens from participation in its democratic
political institutions").
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'them' is 'the essence of a consensual political identity."'432 Thus, un-
less some fruits of the community are reserved to its members, it
quickly loses its identity;433 it would "obliterate all the distinctions be-
tween citizens and aliens, and thus depreciate the historic value of
citizenship. '"4
4
Drawing on this political theory, states have occasionally enacted
alienage laws in an effort to preserve what they see as the commu-
nity's identity. These laws view immigrants, particularly those of ra-
cial and ethnic diversity, as threatening social cohesion and cultural
uniformity. 3 Aliens may be accused of bringing incompatible cus-
toms, language, and values to our communities, thus undermining
America's cultural hegemony and social welfare.436 But is preserving
a static vision of community truly a permissible state objective; and, if
so, what forms of alienage laws would it justify?
The Supreme Court has never accepted a cultural preservation
theory as a legitimate state interest. In Plyler, the Court rejected the
notion that undocumented children imposed unique burdens on pub-
lic schools, either economically or in the educational mission to incul-
cate civic virtue.437 In a similar vein, the Court has held that states
have no legitimate interest in promoting naturalization.438 States can
neither augment nor detract from the meaning of citizenship by with-
holding or conferring benefits for that purpose alone.4 39 Nor can they
preserve their civil institutions for citizens. State laws denying aliens
access to courts or judicial remedies are seldom upheld." °
432. Linda S. Bosniak, Exclusion and Membership: The Dual Identity of the Undocu-
mented Worker Under United States Law, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 955, 963 (1988).
433. See Search for National Identity, supra note 66, at 1512-13.
434. Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432,439 (1982) (quoting Foley, 435 U.S. at 295).
435. Birthright Citizenship, supra note 112, at 1026.
436. See Public Benefits, supra note 292, at 242 (describing argument that aliens' "non-
conforming culture will erode the national language and lifestyle").
437. 457 U.S. 202, 229 (1982).
438. See Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 10 (1977).
439. Immigration Policy, supra note 28, at 1413.
440. See Hagl v. Jacob Stem & Sons, Inc., 396 F. Supp. 779, 784-85 (E.D. Pa. 1975)
(finding that in personal injury action, status as undocumented alien would not justify
jury's reduction of damage award for loss of future earnings); Peterson v. Neme, 281
S.E.2d 869, 872 (Va. 1981) (finding that in negligence action, status as undocumented alien
irrelevant and immaterial to right to recover damages for lost wages); Feldman v. Murray,
12 N.Y.S.2d 533 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1939) (holding that undocumented status does not preclude
suit for personal injuries); Montoya v. Gateway Ins. Co., 401 A.2d 1102, 1104 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1979) (upholding undocumented alien's right to pursue contract claim
against insurance company); Catalanotto v. Palazzolo, 259 N.Y.S.2d 473,476-77 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1965) (undocumented aliens entitled to compensation from uninsured motorists fund);
Cabral v. State Bd. of Control, 169 Cal. Rptr. 604, 606-07 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (finding
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Still, the Court is not insensitive to a state's need for political
identity and some meaningful way to distinguish between those who
belong and those who do not. Thus, while the Court disallows most
distinctions between newcomers and tenured residents, 41 and among
different categories of residents," 2 it uniformly rejects voting rights
claims by outsiders." 3 Yet, it appears, political and economic exclu-
sion are entirely different matters; the latter not being justified by the
need for state identity or to preserve its separate existence in our fed-
eralistic structure.
4. Denial of State Benefits
States may seek to deny a panoply of social service benefits to
aliens, such as education, public health care, and public assistance. A
variety of justifications are advanced for these restrictions. One is
that cultural differences present unique problems in integrating aliens
into the community, such as in educational settings." 4 It is also as-
serted that denying undocumented aliens state benefits deters their
illegal entry or presence in the country,445 and that no one should
profit from their own illegal conduct."16 However, the principal justi-
undocumented alien entitled to recovery from crime victim's compensation fund); Ayala v.
California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 126 Cal. Rptr. 210, 213 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976)
(holding that undocumented status does not preclude recovery of disability benefits).
441. E.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-31 (1969) (striking durational resi-
dency requirements for welfare benefits).
442. E.g., Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 61-64 (1982) (striking differential state surplus
payments to residents based on length of residency).
443. Cf. Perkins v. Smith, 370 F. Supp. 134 (Md. 1974), summarily affd, 426 U.S. 913
(1976) (finding exclusion of aliens from service on jury panel did not deny equal protec-
tion). But see Jamin B. Raskin, Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The Historical, Constitutional
and Theoretical Meanings of Alien Suffrage, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1391, 1394 (1993).
444. See supra subsection 3.
445. See, e.g., Alonso v. State, 123 Cal. Rptr. 536, 543-44 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975) (finding
denial of unemployment insurance will make undocumented aliens less likely to maintain
presence in this country), cert. denied, 425 U.S 903 (1976). See also Section III D, supra.
446. See, e.g., Alonso, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 544 (providing unemployment insurance to un-
documented aliens would allow them to profit from their illegal entry into the country).
But see Nizamuddowlah v. Bengal Cabaret, Inc., 415 N.Y.S.2d 685, 686 (N.Y. App. Div.
1979) (finding little merit in the argument that an alien's "unclean hands" should bar re-
covery of benefits, because that result would unjustly enrich the employer); Commercial
Standard Fire & Marine Co. v. Galindo, 484 S.W.2d 635, 636-37 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972)
(undocumented status does not bar workers' compensation when contract of employment
did not aid in illegal entry). A related justification is that, by entering or remaining in the
country illegally, aliens have "waived" their rights. See Public Benefits, supra note 292, at
242 n.156.
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fication given, for both legal and illegal immigrants, is that denying
them benefits preserves state resources for citizens.' 7
A state may validly assert an interest in the disposition of state
resources." Moreover, the Court is sensitive to a state's sovereign
interest in the distribution of its largess. To the extent that a commu-
nity's resources can be seen as collectively owned by citizens,449 their
property-like ownership encompasses the right to exclude others.45
Nonetheless, while a state may assert a sovereign interest in the dispo-
sition of its resources in some contexts,451 such immunity does not ex-
tend when the superior sovereignty of federal supremacy is
implicated.
The federal government's plenary power over the admission of
aliens includes the authority to prescribe conditions for their liveli-
hood and residency. Accordingly, unsanctioned state efforts to deny
public social service benefits to aliens may tread upon federal power
and policies. States cannot deny benefits to resident aliens without
negating, at least in part, the federal decision to admit them to resi-
447. See People v. Crane, 108 N.E. 427,429-30 (N.Y. 1915), affd, 239 U.S. 195 (1915)
(Cardozo, J.) ("To disqualify aliens is discrimination indeed, but not arbitrary discrimina-
tion; for the principle of exclusion is the restriction of the resources of the state to the
advancement and profit of the members of the state. Ungenerous and unwise such dis-
crimination may be. It is not for that reason unlawful .... The state, in determining what
use shall be made of its own moneys, may legitimately consult the welfare of its own citi-
zens, rather than that of aliens"). See generally Immigration Policy, supra note 28, at 1452-
54.
448. See, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67,80 (1976) (suggesting in dicta that an illegal
entrant cannot "advance even a colorable constitutional claim to a share in the bounty that
a conscientious sovereign makes available to its own citizens and [some] of its guests");
Hernandez v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 558 S.W.2d 121, 125 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977)
(holding that the state's need to conserve public resources is a legitimate reason to deny
undocumented alien children an education).
449. Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175, 194 (1915) (affirming "the power of the state over
its wild game which might be preserved for its own citizens"); Geer v. Connecticut, 161
U.S. 519, 533-34 (1896) (wild game considered state property), overruled by Hughes v.
Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
450. See Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 39-40 (1915). See also McCarter v. Hudson
County Water Co., 65 A. 489,492 (N.J. 1906), affd, 209 U.S. 349 (1908) ("the government
established in this state by and for the people thereof has complete dominion (subject only
to constitutional limitations) over all things within the borders of the state... The regula-
tion of the use and disposal of such waters, therefore, if it be within the powers of the state,
is among the most important objects of government.").
451. See e.g., Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. 794 (1976) (describing "market
participant" immunity to dormant Commerce Clause.) See generally Karl Manheim, New
Age Federalism and the Market Participant Doctrine, 22 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 559, 568-69 (1990)
[hereinafter New Age Federalism].
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dency.4 52 Although the Supreme Court often views this in equal pro-
tection terms, it is equally a matter of federal supremacy. Just as
states cannot unilaterally deny certain benefits to newcomers453 and
out-of-staters,454 without disrupting our federalistic scheme, they may
also lack power to deny those benefits to non-citizens.4 5 Thus, a
state's interest in preserving the public fisc, as strong as it is, does not
justify differential treatment of resident aliens regarding state bene-
fits, 45 6 state resources,457 or taxation.45 8 "[A] concern for the preserva-
tion of resources standing alone can hardly justify the classification
used in allocating those resources. '459 In other words, "[i]t is not suf-
ficient justification that a law saves money. ' 4 61
A state's ability to deny state benefits to "illegal" aliens is less
certain and requires close examination of both state and federal poli-
cies. Where a state pursues legitimate objectives in its benefit de-
nial,461 and that objective is compatible with federal policy, it is likely
to survive. Thus, "undocumented status, coupled with some articul-
able federal policy, might enhance state authority with respect to the
treatment of undocumented aliens. ' 462 On the other hand, where de-
nial conflicts with federal objectives, states will be required to extend
benefits. For instance, while many federal entitlement programs deny
452. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 380 (1971) ("State alien residency require-
ments that either deny welfare benefits to noncitizens or condition them on longtime resi-
dency, equate with the assertion of a right, inconsistent with federal policy, to deny
entrance and abode. Since such laws encroach upon exclusive federal power, they are
constitutionally impermissible.") (quoting Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 42 (1915)).
453. E.g., Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250,269 (1974) (relying on
the right to travel strand of equal protection).
454. E.g., Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396-403 (1948) (relying on the fundamental
rights doctrine in the Privileges and Immunities Clause).
455. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 85 (1976) ("Insofar as state welfare policy is con-
cerned, there is little, if any, basis for treating persons who are citizens of another State
differently from persons who are citizens of another country. Both groups are noncitizens
as far as the State's interests in administering its welfare programs are concerned").
456. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (welfare benefits); Toll v. Moreno,
458 U.S. 1 (1982) (higher education); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (primary and
secondary education); See In re Alien Children Educ. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Tex.
1980).
457. See Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948) (rejecting the "special
public interest" doctrine).
458. United States v. City of Glen Cove, 322 F. Supp. 149 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (mandating
tax exempt status of foreign owned property).
459. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 227.
460. Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 586 (E.D. Tex. 1978), affd. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
461. Sudomir v. McMahon, 767 F.2d 1456, 1465 (9th Cir. 1985) ("state laws discriminat-
ing against illegal aliens must be shown to further at least a substantial interest of the
state") (citing Plyler, 457 U.S. at 217-18).
462. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 226.
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benefits to undocumented immigrants, 3 others specifically require
benefits be made available to them.' s Preemption can also be in-
ferred from federal law.465 Thus, state laws that mandate blanket de-
nial of benefits to "illegal aliens" may fall under standard preemption
principles. 6
Discrimination against undocumented immigrants in state benefit
programs may also be constitutionally precluded. While not a direct
regulation of immigration, these laws may nonetheless burden na-
tional policies without sufficient offsetting state benefit. The best
known example of this balancing process occurred in Plyler v. Doe.
While principally an equal protection case, the Court relied heavily on
supremacy theory to support its use of heightened review.46 A state
may not simply adopt federal distinctions between legal and illegalimmigration and write the discrimination into state law. This is most
obvious when it comes to discriminating among classes or nationalities
of aliens. The federal government protects a range of interests that
are unavailable to the states.468 Many of its criteria have foreign pol-
icy overtones. Others are integral to immigration control. Still others
463. For instance, undocumented alien children are ineligible for AFDC (45 C.F.R.
§ 233.50 (1988). AFDC, a cooperative federal-state program financed with federal and
state funds, is one of four categorical public assistance programs established by the Social
Security Act of 1935. 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1995). See King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 316-17
(1968) (discussing requirements of Social Security Act); See generally, Jenifer M. Bosco,
Undocumented Immigrants, Economic Justice and Welfare Reform in California, 8 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 71 (1994).
464. Undocumented aliens are generally eligible under federal law for emergency medi-
cal services (see 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(v)(3) (Supp. 1991) [Medicaid]; 42 U.S.C. § 291c(e)
(1988) [Hill-Burton Act]), the Women, Infants and Children Program (WIC) (see 42 U.S.C.
§ 1786 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (originally enacted as § 17 of the Child Nutrition Act of
1966, Pub. L. No. 89-642, § 17, 80 Stat.), Headstart and school-related programs (see 42
U.S.C. § 17751 (1988) [School Lunch Program]; 42 U.S.C. § 1766 (Supp. IV 1991) [Child
and Adult Care Food Program]; 42 U.S.C. § 1761 (1988 & Supp. IV 1991) [Summer Food
Service Programs]).
465. In re Alien Children Educ. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 544, 587-88 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
466. See, e.g., Papadopoulos v. Shang, 414 N.Y.S.2d 152, 154-55 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979)
(alien found entitled to Medicaid benefits during pendency of her application for change of
status); St. Francis Hosp. v. D'Elia, 422 N.Y.S.2d 104, 110 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979) (alien
whose nonimmigrant visa had expired and whose application for an immigrant visa was
pending found entitled to medical assistance), affd, 422 N.E.2d 830 (N.Y. 1981). See also
Velasquez v. Secretary of the Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 581 F. Supp. 16, 17
(E.D.N.Y. 1984) (requiring the Secretary to come forward with some explanation for the
INS's inaction regarding an alien claimant's deportation before concluding that the alien
was not "permanently residing in the United States under color of law" and therefore
ineligible for SSI benefits); Sudomir v. McMahon, 767 F.2d 1456, 1466 (9th Cir. 1985) (de-
nying AFDC benefits to asylum applicant pending action by INS).
467. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 225 (1982).
468. Cf. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
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are "based on distinctions of 'color and race,"' which states cannot
make.469 Thus, as a rule, states may not rely on federal classifications
unless they have independent grounds for doing so.470
That independent ground legitimately may be protection of state
resources. But it may not be hostility to immigration, legal or illegal.
For instance, a state's denial of resident tuition subsidies to undocu-
mented students at state colleges may be justified on fiscal grounds.4 71
But a total exclusion of such students, whether or not they pay tuition
or have scholarships,472 may not be. Similarly, the investigation and
reporting of immigration status unconnected to any fiscal need fails to
advance a legitimate state interest. The more likely impetus for these
programs is hostility to the presence of aliens and frustration with fed-
eral efforts to enforce immigration laws.473 Neither of these purposes
are lawful bases for state regulation. "Measures intended to increase
or decrease immigration, whether legal or illegal, are the province of
the federal government."'474
Yet, immigration status is not irrelevant to lawful state objectives.
For instance, courts have upheld the denial of state unemployment
insurance benefits on the theory that if an alien is undocumented, he
is "not available for work," and therefore not entitled to benefits. 475
469. Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 412 (1948) (citing Hidemitsu
Toyota v. United States, 268 U.S. 402, 411-12 (1925)). In Takahashi, California employed
federal immigration classifications to deny commercial fishing licenses to Japanese. The
Court held that California did not have the same interests as the federal government, and
could not rely on the same classifications.
470. "The State may borrow the federal classification. But to justify its use as a crite-
rion for its own discriminatory policy, the State must demonstrate that the classification is
reasonably adapted to '[the purposes for which the state desires to use it.]' Plyler, 457
U.S. at 226 (quoting Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 664-65 (1948) (Murphy, J., concur-
ring)); Barannikova v. Town of Greenwich, 643 A.2d 251,262-63 (Conn. 1994) (finding that
to permit discrimination against aliens, "it would not necessarily suffice for the provisions
of state law to parallel those contained in federal law, if federal law has not authorized or
required such state legislation"). See also Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,490-
94 (1989) (finding state may not borrow federal classifications in creating affirmative action
plan).
471. See, e.g., Regents of the University of California v. Superior Court, 276 Cal. Rptr.
197, 201 (1991).
472. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 66010.8 (Deering Supp. 1995) [Proposition 187, Section
8]; Am. Ass'n of Women v. Board of Trustees, 38 Cal. Rptr. 15, 20 (1995)
473. "Every applicable provision of the Constitution refutes the notion that the states
can act independently for the purpose of affecting foreign relations." Federalism and For-
eign Relations, supra note 13, at 307.
474. In re Alien Children Educ. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 544, 578 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
475. Gutierrez v. Employment Dev. Dept., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 705, 710 (Cal. Ct. App.
1993), and cases cited therein at 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 709; Bastas v. Board of Review, 382
A.2d 923 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978); Alonso v. State of California, 123 Cal. Rptr.
536, 541 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975). See also Sure-Tan v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 903 (1984) (in
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A similar result has obtained with workers' compensation, on the the-
ory that undocumented workers are unable to return to work through
no fault of the employer.476 Here the state's interests are arguably
strong47 7 and the interference with federal immigration power
weak.478 The question of an applicant's immigration status is not for
the purpose of enforcing or subjugating the federal immigration
laws.479 Indeed, denial of state unemployment benefits may be consis-
tent both with federal labor policy °80 and federal immigration policy.
A state law with incidental impact on immigration will be valid if it is
compatible with "some articulable federal policy.""'
Aliens lawfully admitted as permanent or temporary residents
must establish their means of support,482 and are therefore unlikely to
pose a strain on a state's economy. Undocumented aliens, on the
other hand, make no such showing. Some claim that "illegal aliens"
cause economic hardship, personal injury and damage to a state's law-
ful residents. 83 Still others may claim that these immigrants are a
computing backpay award under NLRA, undocumented workers "must be deemed 'un-
available' for work"); Melendres v. Soales, 306 N.W.2d 399, 402 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981)
(personal injury plaintiff's immigration status not relevant for determining liability but ma-
terial to measure of damages for lost future earnings insofar as he was deportable); Metal-
working Machinery, Inc. v. Superior Court, 138 Cal. Rptr. 369 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (same).
476. See, e.g., Manis Constr. Co. v. Arellano, 411 S.E.2d 233 (Va. Ct. App. 1991) (un-
documented alien unable to establish his residual work capacity for purposes of entitle-
ment to compensation for partial disability).
477. The state has an interest in the economic effects of placing aliens in the labor
market. See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973) (regarding state economic inter-
ests and the concept of federalism).
478. See 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(14)(c) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (Secretary of Labor to deny
certification to state programs that make unemployment compensation available to un-
documented aliens); Note, Illegal Aliens and Workers' Compensation: The Aftermath of
Sure-Tan and IRCA, 7 HOFSTRA LAB. L. J. 393, 412-13 (1990) [hereinafter Workers' Com-
pensation] (arguing that compensation benefits to undocumented workers is preempted by
IRCA).
479. See Diaz v. Kay-Dix Ranch, 88 Cal. Rptr. 443 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970).
480. See Wagner-Peyser Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 49-49k (1994), stating the national policy to
establish employment offices for persons "legally qualified to engage in gainful
occupations."
481. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 226 (1982). While Plyler was based on equal protec-
tion grounds rather than preemption, the Court still seemed to require the state to show
compatibility between state laws affecting immigrants and federal immigration policy. This
indicates a different standard than used in De Canas, where the Court seemed to put the
burden on the challengers to show incompatibility. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351,357-58
(1976).
482. It is grounds for exclusion if an applicant is likely to become a public charge. 8
U.S.C. 1182(a)(15) (1995). See De La Garza Perales v. Casillas, 950 F.2d 1066, 1068 (5th
Cir. 1992).
483. See Proposition 187, Section 1, Findings and Declarations (uncodified). These
claims are reminiscent of arguments supplied by states during the nineteenth century as
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drain on state social services, depriving lawful residents of state and
local programs. Whether undocumented aliens are a net gain or net
loss on state revenues is a matter of intense economic and political
debate.484 But, states cannot simply assume a conclusion as justifica-
tion for its laws. 48 5 Alienage discrimination can easily become indi-
rect regulation of immigration. State ends and means need to be
scrutinized to prevent that from occurring.
V. Equal Protection Analysis of Alienage Laws
Because non-residents lack any political voice in the community's
decisionmaking, discrimination against them can be suspect.486 Non-
residents might be singled out for disadvantaged treatment because
they have no direct political recourse. If this is the perceived motiva-
tion for discriminatory treatment, the Supreme Court is likely to take
a harder look at the law. This is true for out-of-state commerce,'8
and out-of-state residents.488 It is also true for discrimination against
aliens.
The Court has emphatically declared that undocumented alien
adults are not a suspect class because their membership in the class is
wholly volitional and illegal.489 Undocumented children, however, are
viewed differently since they "can affect neither their parents' conduct
nor their own status. 49 ° Still, they do not fit comfortably into the
Court's "suspect" or "quasi-suspect" jurisprudence. Thus, instead of
applying strict or mid-level scrutiny to state laws denying public
justification for the alien inspection laws "to protect the State against the consequences of
the flood of pauperism immigrating from Europe". See Henderson v. Mayor of New York,
92 U.S. 259, 268 (1875) (reviewing state's claim that it was a proper exercise of the police
power "to protect its cities and towns from the expense of supporting persons who are
paupers or diseased, or helpless women and children, coming from foreign countries").
484. There are many who argue that undocumented aliens contribute more in taxes
than they receive in program benefits. However, as the Urban Institute recently reported,
"the distribution of costs and revenues within the intergovernmental system can be viewed
as being in imbalance. Immigrant tax payments flow to Washington while most of the costs
of providing services fall to state and local government." Testimony of Michael Fix and
Jeffrey S. Passel before the House Ways and Means Comm., Federal Doc. Clearing House
Cong. Testimony, June 15, 1994.
485. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 228.
486. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DisTRusT, 161-62 (1980).
487. See anti-discrimination principle under the dormant Commerce Clause.
488. Similar judicial scrutiny applies to discrimination against non-residents under the
Privileges and Immunities Clause.
489. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219 n.19 (1982); id at 220 ("Nor is undocumented
status an absolutely immutable characteristic since it is the product of conscious, indeed
unlawful, action.").
490. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 220 (citing Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 770 (1977)).
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schooling to undocumented children, the Court in Plyler ostensibly
invalidated the laws on the force of rational basis review. To do so,
the Court implicitly created a new, albeit unarticulated, standard of
review-rational basis with bite.491 This standard, however, applies
only to state laws; federal laws of this character still receive highly
deferential review. Accordingly, the Court's equal protection doc-
trine, as applied to alienage classifications, is always "attentive to con-
gressional policy,"4  suggesting a synthesis of equality and supremacy
theories.
The Supreme Court has also erected an elaborate structure for
handling discrimination against resident aliens, who are nominally a
suspect class.493 Most state discrimination against them can only be
justified upon showing a compelling state interest and necessary
means.494 However, where the discrimination relates to jobs implicat-
ing the state's sovereign identity, e.g., public officials and school teach-
ers,495 rather than its pecuniary interest in the public fisc or its parens
patriae interest in the general welfare, the degree of scrutiny drops
precipitously to rational basis. This is the "political function" sub-
doctrine.496
This structure makes little sense in equal protection terms. Why
would the nature of a state's interest change the scope of review? A
491. See generally Gayle Pettings, Rational Basis With Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny By
Any Other Name, 62 INrD. L. J. 779 (1987).
492. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 224.
493. They were not always so. See Patsone v. Pennsylvania 232 U.S. 138 (1914); Ter-
race v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923); Cockrill v. California, 268 U.S. 258 (1925); Ohio v.
Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392 (1927), applying lesser standards of review in upholding state
alien discrimination laws.
494. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971) (the "Court's decisions have
established that classifications based on alienage, like those based on nationality or race,
are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny. Aliens as a class are a prime
example of a 'discrete and insular minority' for whom such heightened judicial solicitude is
appropriate").
495. Public school teaching "constitutes a governmental function ... [and] public school
teachers may be regarded as performing a task 'that goes to the heart of representative
government'." Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 75-76 (1979) (quoting Sugarman v. Dou-
gall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973)).
496. The political function exception allows states to discriminate against aliens only
with respect to "state elective or important nonelective executive, legislative, and judicial
positions," i.e., those officers who "participate directly in the formulation, execution, or
review of broad public policy" and hence "perform functions that go right to the heart of
representative government." Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 222 (1984). The exception is
narrowly construed. ld. at 222 n.7. See also Ambach, 441 U.S. at 73-74 ("some state func-
tions are so bound up with the operation of the State as a governmental entity as to permit
the exclusion from those functions of all persons who have not become part of the process
of self-government").
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state's interest may be strong enough to survive whatever standard
was set (e.g., "compelling" or "important"), but in no other doctrinal
area of equal protection does it modify the standard itself. Aliens are
no less (or more) suspect when they apply for a job as a school teacher
than when the job title is civil engineer. Yet, a dramatically different
standard of review is used supposedly because the state's sovereign
interests are implicated in the first instance, but not the second.497 As
one commentator put it, "our theories of equal protection [in alienage
cases] have become a Humpty Dumpty; when pushed they do not sim-
ply bruise, they crumble. 498
The Supreme Court has conceded that "many of [its] decisions
concerning alienage classifications ... are better explained in preemp-
tion than in equal protection terms. 499 Many commentators agree.500
This is perhaps best indicated by Mathews v. Diaz,501 where the Court
applied relaxed scrutiny to a federal law discriminating against
aliens.502 The Court emphasized that Congress, as an aspect of its
broad power over immigration and naturalization, enjoys rights to dis-
tinguish among aliens that are not shared by the states.50 3 It is not
497. States validly "may determine eligibility for the key position in discharging [polit-
ical functions] on the assumption that generally persons who are citizens, or who have not
declined the opportunity to seek United States citizenship, are better qualified than are
those who have elected to remain aliens." Ambach, 441 U.S. at 81.
498. Tom Geraty, Children in the Labyrintk The Complexities of Plyler v. Doe, 44 U.
Prrr. L. REv. 379, 379 (1983).
499. Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 11 (1982).
500. See, e.g., Michael J. Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Ap-
praisal, 79 COLUM. L. Rev. 1023, 1060-65 (1979); Note, The Equal Treatment of Aliens:
Preemption or Equal Protection?, 31 STAN. L. REv. 1069 (1979); Note, State Burdens on
Resident Aliens: A New Preemption Analysis, 89 YALE L.J. 940 (1980); G. GUNTHER, CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW 685 (12th ed. 1991) [hereinafter GUNTHER]; LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTrruTIoNAL LAW 1550-51 n.57 (2d ed. 1988). See also Toll v. Moreno, 458
U.S. 1, 11 n.16 (1982).
501. 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
502. But see Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976) (striking down an undif-
ferentiated exclusion of aliens from the federal civil service). The discrimination in Hamp-
ton was ordered not by Congress, but by a federal administrative agency-the Civil Service
Commission. This suggests that Congress' plenary power over immigration is not shared
by other organs of the federal government. Thus, judicial deference to federally created
distinctions involving aliens is due in part to the political character of the federal immigra-
tion power. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
503. Mathews, 426 U.S. at 84-87. See generally Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law
After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpreta-
tion, 100 YALE L. J. 545 (1990) [hereinafter Century of Plenary Power] (discussing plenary
power doctrine which results in great judicial deference to immigration decisions of the
national political branches). There is also some suggestion that the equal protection com-
ponent of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause (see Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497
(1954)) is not as strong as the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, at least
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merely that the governmental interest may be stronger, the equal pro-
tection doctrine itself assumes a different posture."° Coupled with
the other mutations in doctrine, one gets the feeling that something
more is going on.50 5
There is evidence that the Court has never fully relied on equal
protection doctrine in state alien discrimination cases. In Graham,
Justice Blackmun offered a significant "additional" reason for invali-
dating state restrictions on aliens-the "area of federal-state rela-
tions. '506 "State laws that restrict the eligibility of aliens for welfare
benefits merely because of their alienage conflict with these overrid-
ing national policies in an area constitutionally entrusted to the Fed-
eral Government."50 7 And in Plyler, Justice Brennan noted: "alienage
classifications may be intimately related to the conduct of foreign pol-
icy, to the federal prerogative to control access to the United States,
and to the plenary federal power to determine who has sufficiently
manifested his allegiance to become a citizen of the Nation. No State
may independently exercise a like power. '50 8
Preemption also better explains why the Court drops its equal
protection scrutiny in "political function" cases; i.e., where the state
discriminates against aliens in positions involving state public policy.
First, the state can claim a genuine interest in reserving for citizens
jobs reflecting the state's quasi-sovereignty." 9 Second, there is lesser
conflict with federal immigration policy when the state denies full
where important national interests are involved. See In re Alien Children Educ. Litig., 501
F. Supp. 544, 567 n.43 (S.D. Tex. 1980); Note, 11 ST. MARY'S L.J. 549, 562-63 (1979). But
see Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995) (applying strict scrutiny to federal
affirmative action program).
504. Mathews, 426 U.S. at 84-85 ("The equal protection analysis also involves signifi-
cantly different considerations because it concerns the relationship between aliens and the
States rather than between aliens and the Federal Government").
505. "A kind of schizophrenia pervades equal protection theory" when applied to
aliens. Judith Lichtenberg, Within the Pale" Aliens, Illegal Aliens, and Equal Protection, 44
U. Prrr. L. REv. 351, 352 (1983).
506. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 377 (1971).
507. Id. at 378.
508. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,219 n.19 (1982). See also Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 11
(1982) ("State laws which impose discriminatory burdens upon the entrance or residence
of aliens lawfully within the United States conflict with this constitutionally derived federal
power to regulate immigration, and have accordingly been held invalid.") (quoting
Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 419 (1948)).
509. The Court respects similar state interests under the dormant Commerce Clause
and the Privileges and Immunities Clause when the state limits hiring to residents. See
White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Emplrs., 460 U.S. 204 (1983) (upholding resi-
dency requirement for employees on public works contracts under "market participant
doctrine"); United Building & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208,
221 (1984) (state's interest in hiring employees was "certainly a factor-perhaps the crucial
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political status to aliens than when it denies them economic survival in
the community.51 0 Thus, unlike other asserted interests behind state
immigration laws, which are often illusory, this one may actually pre-
vail when balanced against federal interests.
Even while it was developing its alien-as-sometimes-suspect-class
theory, the Court occasionally relied on preemption doctrine to re-
view state immigration laws. In Toll v. Moreno,51' the Court invali-
dated a Maryland law denying preferential tuition rates to resident
aliens. "In light of Congress' explicit decision not to bar... aliens
from acquiring domicile, [the state restriction] surely amounts to an
ancillary 'burden not contemplated by Congress' in admitting these
aliens to the United States. 512 Therefore, "the University's policy vi-
olates the Supremacy Clause.1513
The Equal Protection Clause is not indispensable to justify a rule
prohibiting state discrimination against aliens.514 Just such an anti-dis-
crimination principal has evolved from the dormant Commerce
Clause and other areas of exclusive federal power. Discrimination
against interstate commerce destroys our "economic union" and in-
vites retaliatory parochialism by sister states.1 5 Discrimination by
states against the federal government is also prohibited by the
Supremacy Clause.516
Moreover, state discrimination against aliens, whether lawfully
admitted or not, may be contrary to international law517 and U.S.
factor-to be considered in evaluating whether the state's discrimination violates the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause."). See also New Age Federalism, supra note 451, at 620-21.
510. Professor Gunther describes this theory: "the federal government, through the im-
migration scheme, 'invites' resident aliens to enter the country as permanent residents free
of restriction-'on an equality of legal privileges with all citizens'-it is not for the states to
alter the terms of immigration with new burdens. Yet the Court appears to reason that
since the federal government does not admit resident aliens to the political community-
admission does not confer citizenship-the states may exclude resident aliens from state
political offices and functions without offending federal power." GUNTHER, supra note
500, at 685.
511. 458 U.S. 1 (1982).
512. Id. at 14.
513. lId at 17.
514. For an example of an alien employment discrimination case relying on preemption
rather than equal protection, see Purdy & Fitzpatrick v. State of California, 456 P.2d 645
(Cal. 1969) (declaring residency requirement for state public works employment violative
of federal supremacy).
515. See Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L.Rnv.
1689, 1692-93 (1984).
516. See Davis v. Michigan Dept. of the Treasury, 489 U.S. 803 (1989).
517. "In consequence of the right of protection over its subjects abroad which every
State enjoys, and the corresponding duty of every State to treat aliens on its territory with
a certain consideration, an alien... must be afforded protection for his person and prop-
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treaty obligations.518 Accordingly, states which discriminate against
aliens can seriously erode, perhaps unwittingly, the nation's standing
in the community of nations. Thus, the effect on federal interests must
be carefully examined in each case. In some cases, discriminatory
state laws will be found to promote or be authorized by federal law.5 19
In other cases, they will be found to jeopardize federal policy or de-
stroy the national uniformity that is so essential to effective foreign
relations.
This supremacy-based anti-discrimination principal is not re-
stricted to state laws that conflict with federal immigration policy; it
applies even where state classifications are modeled after federal law.
For instance, in Oyama v. California,520 the Court invalidated Califor-
nia's Alien Land Law which forbade aliens ineligible for citizenship
from owning agricultural land in the state. Shortly thereafter, the
Court invalidated a California law denying commercial fishing licenses
to aliens not eligible for citizenship.5"' "[T]he power of a state to ap-
ply its laws exclusively to its alien inhabitants as a class is confined
within narrow limits."5 22 In both cases, the Court found these discrim-
inatory state laws obstructed federal policy,523 notwithstanding their
supposed conformity to federal law, thus demonstrating an anti-dis-
crimination component to the supremacy analysis.524
The burden that state alien discrimination laws impose on federal
interests is well-illustrated by Proposition 187. The initiative not only
discriminates against aliens, it does so in a way likely to frustrate fed-
eral objectives.5' State investigatory and regulatory measures are
erty.... [E]very State is by the Law of Nations compelled to grant to aliens at least
equality before the law with its citizens, as far as safety of person and property is con-
cerned." 1 L. LASSA OPPENHEIM, INMRNATIONAL LAW 627-28 (6th ed. 1947). See also
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 65 (1941) ("In general, both treaties and international
practices have been aimed at preventing injurious discriminations against aliens."); Todok
v. Union State Bank of Harvard, 281 U.S. 449, 454-55 (1930).
518. "Numerous treaties, in return for reciprocal promises from other governments,
have pledged the solemn obligation of this nation to the end that aliens residing in our
territory shall not be singled out for the imposition of discriminatory burdens." Hines, 312
U.S. at 69.
519. See De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976), discussed infra at 166.
520. 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
521. Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
522. 1& at 420.
523. Oyama, 332 U.S. at 640-41; Takahashi, 334 U.S. at 418-20.
524. See also Doe v. Plyler, 458 F.Supp. 569,591 (E.D. Tex. 1978) ("[t]he question[ ] of
[the state law's] consistency with congressional intent and of its validity under the equal
protection clause are intimately related.").
525. "The virtual prohibition of state discrimination is based on the assumptions that
states are institutionally incompetent to take adequate account of the sensitive interna-
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triggered whenever a state employee "suspects" a recipient of state
benefits is undocumented.526 This even extends to parents of public
school students, each of whom must be investigated for residency sta-
tus. 527 Thus, the initiative does not limit its wrath to undocumented
aliens, although they are the ultimate target of the law. In operation,
many of the burdens of the initiative also fall on lawful aliens and
citizens who are merely "suspected" of being present illegally.52 8 This
facilitates harassment of and discrimination against particular ethnic
groups. "Immigration law consequently becomes a tool in the hands
of untrained local law enforcement officials to treat minorities in a
discriminatory and nonuniform fashion.""52
Just such a concern motivated an anti-discrimination provision in
the IRCA.530  "'[P]eople of "foreign" appearance might be made
more vulnerable by the imposition of [employer] sanctions' due to the
fact that 'some employers may decide not to hire "foreign" appearing
individuals to avoid sanctions.' 5 31 IRCA responds by prohibiting
these forms of discrimination.532 Proposition 187 flouts this federal
concern by encouraging discrimination against aliens and persons of
foreign appearance.5 33 Since courts must "consider the relationship
between state and federal laws as they are interpreted and applied,
not merely as they are written,51 34 there is a strong likelihood that
Proposition 187 will frustrate federal anti-discrimination policy em-
bodied in its immigration laws.
tional and immigration policy issues implicated by discriminatory laws affecting legally
present aliens." Immigration Policy, supra note 28, at 1448.
526. See supra note 217.
527. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48215 (d) (Deering Supp. 1995). Notwithstanding, burdens
may not be imposed on children otherwise entitled to state benefits solely on the basis of
their parents' immigration status. Darces v. Woods, 679 P.2d 458 (Cal. 1984). Cf Plyler v.
Doe 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
528. See People v. Barajas, 147 Cal. Rptr. 195, 204 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) ("attempts by
local police officers to enforce immigration laws pose an inherent danger to United States
citizens and resident aliens mistaken for illegal entrants.") (Reynoso, J., dissenting).
529. Criminal Immigration Statutes, supra note 270, at 1006.
530. IRCA § 274b(a) (1995); 8 U.S.C. § 1324b (1994).
531. See Mark Johnson Boulris, Judicial Deference to the Chief Executive's Interpreta-
tion of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 Antidiscrimination Provision, 41
U. MIAMI L. REv. 1057, 1057 (1987).
532. See Justice Unveils Proposed Anti-Bias Rules Implementing Immigration Reform
and Control Act, DAILY REPORT FOR EXECUTIVES, March 23, 1987, p. A-5
533. "[L]ocal police officers have no training or expertise in the complexities in enforc-
ing immigration and naturalization laws. Their awkward attempts to enforce such laws has
resulted in numerous complaints of harassment from citizens and resident aliens mistaken
for illegal entrants." People v. Barajas, 147 Cal. Rptr. 195, 206 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) (Rey-
noso, J., dissenting). See also United States v. Mallides, 473 F.2d 859, 860 (9th Cir. 1973).
534. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 526 (1977).
STATE IMMIGRATION AND FEDERAL SUPREMACY
Proposition 187 also destroys the required national uniformity of
action in dealing with immigration. Either other states will follow
California's lead and adopt their own supplemental immigration
laws,535 or they will likely experience a disproportionate burden of
illegal entrants. If they do the former, then federal immigration laws
become mostly irrelevant as each state does its utmost to encumber
immigration. If they do nothing, they may wind up with California's
discards. California may act to attract aliens, even those there ie-
gally,536 but it cannot shift its burdens onto sister states.537 Doing so
violates the Commerce Clause,538 the right to travel,539 and federal
supremacy. In the area of immigration, if in no other area, the nation
must act in unison.5 40
VI. Conclusion
The struggle between state and federal governments over immi-
gration policy, while perhaps not as volatile as the struggle for control
over commerce, has nonetheless been a lesson in the meaning of fed-
eralism. Throughout our history, states have reacted when they felt
the federal government incompetent or unwilling to properly regulate
immigration. These reactions are often simplistic in form, yet devas-
tating in consequence. The history of state immigration laws demon-
strates that the matter cannot be properly regulated at the local level,
535. Indeed, that is the hope of the initiative's sponsors. They state: "California can
strike a blow for the taxpayer that will be heard across America; in Arizona, in Texas and
in Florida in the same way Proposition 13 was heard across the land." Argument in Favor
of Prop. 187, official ballot pamphlet, p. 54-55 (1994).
536. See Public Benefits, supra note 292.
537. See Dolores Canning Co. v. Howard, 115 Cal. Rptr. 435, 443 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974)
(invalidating California law prohibiting employment of undocumented aliens because, inter
alia, "[t]hose not entitled to lawful residence in California might consider it easier and
safer to seek employment in other states without a similar law-particularly border
states.... Even though the aliens shifting across state lines are illegally in the United
States, it is a recognized problem. However laudable the purpose of section 2805, it clearly
affects immigration in areas of federal concern."). See also Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33
(1915).
538. Kassell v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981).
539. Proposition 187 is apparently designed to disrupt patterns of illegal immigration
by, inter alia, redirecting aliens to other states. Just as durational residency requirements
with a similar intent violate the right to travel (Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)),
so too do laws denying benefits to aliens. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 85 (1976).
540. "Each locality in each State may not adopt its own foreign policy. This would be
disastrous, not only because of multiplicity and divergence of policies, but because local
decisions are often influenced by pragmatic local considerations which are not necessarily
controlling or even relevant to national policy as determined by the Federal Government
at Washington." New York Times Co. v. City of New York Comm'n on Human Rights, 361
N.E.2d 963, 969 (N.Y. 1977).
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embracing, as its does, a wide array of social, political, and economic
factors. Most importantly, "state regulation with respect to aliens can
significantly affect our foreign relations, often without implementing
any justifiable domestic interest."'541
States may be unable to regulate immigration, sometimes even in
pursuit of valid state interests, but they are hardly irrelevant to the
debate. The federalistic structure of our nation that protects the states
and their interests through political means, works in this field as well.
Although perhaps not as sensitive as states would sometimes like,
Congress does respect state concerns and responds to their com-
plaints. Still, that is where the power and the responsibility lay. When
one examines the plenary and exclusive power of Congress over immi-
gration, she will find "there is not merely a page of history, but a
whole volume." 542
541. Federalism and Foreign Relations, supra note 13, at 300-01.
542. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954) (citation omitted).
